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ABSTRACT 
Efficiency Measurement in the Regulated Sector: An Empirical 
Study of the Massachusetts Electric Utility Industry 
Employing the Williamson Expense Preference Theory 
In a Pooled Regression Model 
(February, 1981) 
William C. Lawler, B.S., University of Connecticut, 
M.S., University of Massachusetts, 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Morton Backer 
In the accounting literature the measurement of top management 
performance is traditionally based upon profitability. Since both 
efficiency and effectiveness impact upon profitability, composite 
measures usually suffice and these separate dimensions of performance 
are seldom investigated. 
However, when focusing on top management performance in the 
regulated sector, profitability measures are of limited use due to the 
constraints placed upon profit. In addition, since management is in¬ 
sulated from competitive pressures, the necessity to be efficient is 
no longer present, and, thus, performance measurement now becomes two 
dimensional--both efficiency and effectiveness must be investigated. 
Of increasing importance to regulatory commissions is the question of 
top management efficiency. 
V 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a prototype model for 
estimating the efficiency of management in the regulated sector. The 
analysis proceeds in two stages. The first stage deals with the lack 
of an operational definition for top management efficiency in the 
regulated sector. Although this subject has been extensively developed 
in the economic literature, it is shown that this generally accepted 
definition of efficiency is not applicable to the problem at hand due 
to the lack of concern for control. To be a valid measure of efficien¬ 
cy, top management control must be demonstrated and, thus, a somewhat 
radical definition of efficiency espoused by Oliver Williamson [1964, 
1970] is operationalized. This definition emphasizes control and 
focuses on expense preference items--those incurred not for their 
contribution to production but rather for the manner in which they 
enhance personal goals. The relationship of these items--size of 
staff, emoluments and discretionary profits--to the cost per kilowatt 
output is then used to measure efficiency. 
The final stage involves the construction of a methodology for 
comparative analysis among utilities which controls for the diverse 
characteristics of these utilities. Since the nature of the industry 
dictates a small sample size when attempting any comparative analysis, 
such diverse factors as vertical integration, generation mix, market 
type, size and variability of demand have historically invalidated 
research findings. By employing a pooled regression model developed 
and extended by Zellner [1966] and Swamy [1970], this problem is over¬ 
come. 
VI 
Using the electric utility industry of Massachusetts as a data 
base, the results of the analysis suggest that at least one expense 
preference item, size of staff, has a statistically significant direct 
relationship to the costs per kilowatt of the utilities in the sample 
and, therefore, may be used as a barometer of top management efficiency. 
In addition, it was found that the pooled regression methodology which, 
as stated, was used to control for the diverse characteristics of the 
utilities, performed well. However, no generalizations were made. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Within the Classical Theory of the Firm, the "invisible hand" 
as described by Adam Smith [1937], plays an important role. Those 
firms which are inefficient are eliminated through the natural selec¬ 
tion process; efficiency becomes a necessary condition for continuity 
of life. As a result, management performance measures need only 
focus on effectiveness; efficiency is prerequisite. 
However, the foundation of the Classical Theory is pure com¬ 
petition, where firms are price-takers, not price-makers. Inefficien¬ 
cy leads to higher costs which cannot simply be passed on to the 
consumer since prices are set by the market and not the firm. This 
does not hold true for other sectors of the economy which may be com¬ 
bined and loosely termed the regulated sectors. Although economic 
theory states that monopolies and oligopolies are price-makers, this, 
in reality, is not true in all cases. The Government, as originally 
hypothesized by Keynes [1931], becomes a regulatory body which sets 
prices to yield "fair" returns. In much the same manner, prices are 
set to yield zero returns in the nonprofit sector. 
The resulting price allows the regulated firm to recover its 
operating costs plus a "fair" return on invested capital, usually de¬ 
fined as that which would assure financial soundness to the investment 
community. Herein lies the problem. The "invisible hand" is no longer 
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operative. The pricing mechanism of the competitive market is short- 
circuited by the regulatory process where firms are now allowed to 
recover all costs plus a fair return on invested capital. It is 
alleged that inefficiencies are simply passed on to consumers in the 
form of higher prices. There is no longer any incentive to be effi¬ 
cient. 
Two factors in the recent past have accentuated this alleged 
problem. First, through the 1960's and into the 1970's, there has 
been more reliance put on government intervention, rather than 
laissez-faire, as the correct method to regulate the economy. In an 
increasing number of sectors, the price-setter has become the govern¬ 
ment rather than the supply and demand conditions of the market. And 
secondly, the advent of double digit inflation has produced a cry for 
better regulatory processes. Consumers correctly argue that ineffi¬ 
ciencies should not be passed on to them, but rather should be ab¬ 
sorbed by the firms. Efficiency as a measure of performance has 
moved to the forefront of the regulatory process. 
However, for a number of reasons, the success of the regula¬ 
tory bodies in measuring efficiency has been limited. First, defini¬ 
tions and objectives have been poorly delineated, if delineated at all. 
Secondly, due to the varied nature of the industries which fall into 
the regulated sectors, widely differing characteristics do not facili¬ 
tate comparisons that may yield evidence of inefficiencies. And 
thirdly, compounding the second problem, the number of firms under the 
regulatory agency is usually small, resulting in questionable validity 
of any statistical methodologies. 
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Current literature abounds with examples of measurement prob¬ 
lems encountered by regulatory agencies. In the automobile industry, 
for example, it has been alleged that the problems besetting Chrysler 
may be due in part to inefficiencies, as evidence by their high costs 
relative to other car manufacturers. Chrysler rebuts these allegations 
by denying that the "Big Three" are comparable--the size of General 
Motors allows it huge economies of scale not available to Chrysler. 
Thus the high costs are not solely due to inefficient management but 
may be explained, in part, by unavailable economies of scale.^ 
2 
Likewise, in the not-for-profit sector, numerous studies have 
used various measures of cost-effectiveness as substantiation for the 
need to consolidate many of New York City's hospitals. A close read¬ 
ing reveals that efficiency rather than cost-effective measures are 
being used as evidence, since cost per inputs (cost per patient and/ 
or cost per bed, as well as cost per average length of stay), not cost 
per output, are discussed. Regardless, the hospitals very simply re¬ 
but these studies by arguing that they are not comparable--some 
specialize in one area, others in another, while still others can be 
termed "general" hospitals. To compare cost per inputs without some 
recognition of these diverse factors yields little useful information 
Vor an excellent discussion of this see the Wall Street 
Journal, "Deepening Mire," December 19, 1979. 
^Two studies that the author is familiar with are: Brooklyn's 
Hospital System, New York State Health Planning Commission [1978] and 
The Effectiveness of the Total New York City Hospital System: Costs 
and Service, Program Planners, Inc. n979X 
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and may very well obscure the true facts. 
Much the same problems are present in the public utility sec¬ 
tor. Costs per kilowatt have been used as measures of efficiency 
without recognition given to the diverse characteristics of the in¬ 
dividual utilities. To control specifically for these factors in a 
statistical sense is difficult for, due to the nature of the industry, 
there is only a small number of utilities. However, to yield any 
useful information, this must be attempted. The focus of this thesis 
will be the public utility sector, specifically the electric utility 
industry in Massachusetts, which will be used in the sections to 
follow to illustrate a systems approach to the development of an 
efficiency measurement model for regulated sectors. The model's 
applicability to other sectors should be apparent. 
The Problem 
The Department of Public Utilities (DPU) in Massachusetts 
finds itself faced with a task that is seemingly impossible to 
accomplish. Its responsibility is to act as an arbiter between the 
utility companies and the consumers in order to insure that the reven¬ 
ues earned by the utilities 
. . . should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in 
the financial soundness of the utility, and should be adequate, 
under efficient and economical management, to maintain and 
support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary 
for proper discharge of its public duties [262 US679, 1923, 
p. 692]. [emphasis added] 
Theoretically, the regulatory process is well defined. Very 
simply, total revenue is constrained such that a utility is allowed 
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to recover its operating costs plus a fair return on invested capital. 
To calculate fair return, the rate base, defined as all assets used 
and useful is multiplied by a composite cost of capital. The tradi¬ 
tional finance model is employed whereby the component costs are 
multiplied by their respective weights to arrive at the composite 
cost. In Massachusetts, the cost of equity capital is fixed at 13% 
after tax. By summing the operating costs and the fair return on in¬ 
vested capital, the allowable revenue is derived and rates are set 
accordingly. Excess profits are returned to the consumer and defi¬ 
ciencies are remedied by rate hikes. 
With the advent of inflationary times in the early 1970's came 
an increase in the number of rate hike requests. Those justified by 
soaring fuel prices and capital costs should properly be granted, with 
the costs then being passed on to the consumer. But those resulting 
from inefficient management should be denied, with the costs then 
being absorbed by the shareholders in the form of lower earnings. The 
demonstration of "efficient and economical management" thus has become 
the focal point of rate hike hearings and has to this date proved in¬ 
surmountable for the DPU. A brief history of one electric utility, 
Boston Edison,^ can best illustrate the scope of the problem faced by 
the DPU and the frustration it has encountered. 
In July 1974, during a rate hike hearing which eventually re- 
^Choice of Boston Edison in the example was based upon avail¬ 
ability of information. Other utilities have gone through much the 
same process, but their histories were not as well documented. There 
is no bias implied in the use of Boston Edison. 
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suited in a $40 million rate hike, the DPU placed the burden of proof 
on Boston Edison by ordering them to undertake an independent study of 
the "efficiency of Boston Edison's operations" [DPU, 1974]. No de¬ 
finition of efficiency was mandated, nor was operations defined, and 
methodology was not even mentioned. A second rate hike request was 
filed and subsequently granted in September 1975 for $29.5 million. 
Three weeks later, in October 1975, a third rate hike request was 
filed for $49.5 million. During hearings on the third request, a 
study by Price Waterhouse [1974] entitled "Manpower Utilization Study" 
was entered as evidence that Boston Edison had undertaken the ordered 
study of efficiency of operations. The report was accepted as an 
initial step and further studies narrowing the focus to top manage¬ 
ment efficiency were suggested. In August 1976, the DPU allowed $11 
million of the requested $49.5 million and concluded with the warning 
that 
. . . the company [Boston Edison] affirmatively demonstrate in 
any future rate case that it has moved to improve the effi¬ 
ciency of its operations and the productivity of its employees, 
both management and non-management [DPU, 1976]. 
A fourth request for $69.5 million was filed in August 1977. 
In response to the above warning, a report by Theodore Barry and 
Associates [1976] was submitted as evidence that Boston Edison was 
improving and/or investigating the efficiency of their operations. 
Focusing only on three areas--individual productivity, work force 
management, and level of productive work--the report was described as 
"woefully inadequate" and the DPU concluded: "Clearly this was not 
the intent of the Commission's directive. Totally disregarded was 
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our insistence that productivity of management be examined" [DPU, 1977]. 
In the summary of the fourth rate hearing, the frustration of 
the DPU is apparent. For five years Boston Edison had refused to 
comply with the directive for an independent audit of management 
efficiency. During this period $120 million in rate relief was 
granted, some portion of it allegedly due to inefficiency of manage¬ 
ment. To order more studies was clearly futile. To penalize manage¬ 
ment by lowering the allowed rate of return on equity would probably 
only penalize the consumer in the long run. The only viable option, 
the DPU concluded, was to attempt another approach. As an incentive 
to increase efficiency, Boston Edison was allowed an additional one- 
half percent return on equity, effective 1978. 
Objectives of Study 
The problem of measuring management efficiency has to be 
attacked in a much more direct manner. Simply to give the utilities 
a rather nebulous directive to study their own efficiency is not 
sufficient, as can be witnessed by the actions of the utility indus¬ 
try. 
A more systematic approach is dictated, involving at least 
three steps. First, the scope has to be defined. Efficient manage¬ 
ment pertains to all levels of management, but of greatest concern is 
top management efficiency. This seems to be the focus of the DPU 
directives. 
Secondly, a definition of efficiency must be explicitly stated. 
Efficiency, to an economist, is a highly theoretical construct while 
efficiency to an accountant may have a much more pragmatic meaning. 
A key step is agreement on an operational definition. 
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And lastly, a methodology for measuring efficiency must be 
developed that will accomplish the task in an objective and verifiable 
manner. Various studies cited in the DPU hearings used some rather 
arbitrary and seemingly biased methods and procedures. A much more 
rigorous and independent model must be developed. 
The purpose of this study is to develop such a model. A brief 
summary of each step follows. 
Scope. The DPU has unequivocally stated that its prime concern is top 
management efficiency. The aforementioned Price Waterhouse and 
Theodore Barry Associates studies were accepted as steps in the right 
direction, but were criticized for the narrowness of their focus. 
Work force management and individual employee productivity are impor¬ 
tant, but of critical concern is top management performance. 
What is needed first is a definition of top management. As 
will be discussed in the following section, since efficiency has to 
do with capital investment as well as routine operating decisions, 
a definition that suggests itself is "that level of management that 
has responsibility for future investment decisions as well as opera¬ 
tions." 
In addition, the distinction between management efficiency 
and segment efficiency must be made clear. The former involves only 
those items that are controllable by management, whereas segment 
efficiency does not make this differentiation. Given that the focus 
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of this thesis is on the former, then any factors that are to be 
examined as to their impact on efficiency must be dichotomized into 
those controllable by management and those not. Those factors which 
management has no influence over, even though their impact on segment 
efficiency is evident, must be segregated and clearly labeled as 
extraneous with regard to management efficiency/ To do otherwise 
would result in a measure of efficiency which would be of little use; 
if control is not established, responsibility cannot be affixed. 
Although the distinction that must be made is clear and well 
documented in the accounting literature on control systems, an oper¬ 
ational definition of control has never been agreed upon. The common 
rule of thumb is that if a manager can influence the incurrence or 
avoidance of the cost, then he has control over that cost. This de¬ 
finition will be used here and in the chapters to follow; where fac¬ 
tors are classified as controllable or uncontrollable, the rationale 
used will be discussed. 
If one is to classify as to long-run or short-run, the con¬ 
cern of this efficiency measurement system will be short-run, due to 
the irreversible nature of the investment decision in the public util¬ 
ity sector. Optimal capital asset mixes will not be investigated, 
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but rather the existing capital asset mixes will be treated as given. 
Although extraneous to this research study, the identifica¬ 
tion, measurement and impact of these factors on the costs per kilowatt 
for the widely differing utilities will prove invaluable to the regu¬ 
latory commission. 
^Existing asset mixes are given and assumed to be sunk and 
therefore uncontrollable. However new asset acquisitions are con¬ 
trollable and are of interest. This factor will be discussed further 
in Chapter IV. 
10 
Efficiency defined. The economic literature has dealt with the prob¬ 
lem of efficiency measurement in the regulated industries in detail. 
Using as a definition of efficiency location along the expansion path 
—the loci of points where the ratio of marginal costs of factor in¬ 
puts is equal to the ratios of their marginal physical products—it 
was shown that in a regulatory environment firms may develop a regu¬ 
latory bias. That is, faced with a constrained return on investment 
capital, to maximize profit they will substitute capital for labor, 
causing a movement from the expansion path. Thus, using the economic 
definition, they are inefficient. 
A number of studies have extended this research by (1) inves¬ 
tigating the underlying assumptions of the model and (2) empirically 
testing its validity. These models will be discussed in detail, but 
their major value will not be as a theory base, but rather as a guide 
in identifying the research problems that are common to the public 
utilities area. 
It will be argued that the major shortcomings of the economic 
definition of efficiency are twofold. First, it has a long-run focus 
when it appears that a short-run focus is more of interest. The econ¬ 
omic model measures the relative factor inputs to the production func¬ 
tion in order to isolate and identify the overcapitalization resulting 
from regulation. These factors are seldom controllable in the short 
run due to the longevity of the capital assets in the utility sector. 
For example, 38 percent of Holyoke Water Power's and 11 percent of 
Western Massachusetts Electric's hydroelectric generation plant are 
over fifty years old. Thus any inefficiencies as measured by the 
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economic model would be in part due to decisions made by management of 
generations past. The objective of this thesis is to develop a model 
that focuses on the performance of current management, not past manage¬ 
ment. As has been stated, to be a valid measure of efficiency, manage¬ 
ment must be able to control the factors being measured. 
The second, but equally important shortcoming of the economic 
definition is its profit maximization assumption. However, where the 
product market is insulated from the conditions of the competitive 
market by regulation, the absolute necessity to be efficient is erased 
since the natural selection process is no longer applicable. Manage¬ 
ment behavior is no longer constrained and a range of discretionary 
behavior becomes possible. It will be argued that this discretionary 
opportunity set affects efficiency in the short run and therefore a 
behavioral theory rather than a classical theory of the firm is appro¬ 
priate when dealing with the public utility sector. 
As an alternative to the classical theory Oliver Williamson 
[1964, 1970] has meticulously developed a behavioral theory which he 
suggests is applicable to the public utilities. Drawing freely from 
the work of Barnard, Cyert, March, Simon and others, he rejects the 
"Economic Man" concept and instead adopts Simon's "Social Man" concept 
--an adaptive organism constantly seeking an equilibrium among compet¬ 
ing personal goals in a continually changing environment. Reviewing 
the literature, Williamson identifies the multitude of elements thought 
to be determinates of behavior and factors them into three groups: 
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size of staff, emoluments, and professional excellence.^ It is these 
factors, it is hypothesized, that will be manifested by the discretion¬ 
ary opportunity set available to the management in a regulated utility. 
In summary, Williamson's model sugests that management, freed 
from the constraints of a competitive environment, is no longer moti¬ 
vated to be efficient, but rather will attempt to reach an equilibrium 
among their own personal goals, even if contradictory to stockholders' 
interests. This behavior will manifest itself through the increasing 
of staff, the addition of emoluments, or a striving for professional 
excellence. Efficiency in the short run is hypothesized to be a func¬ 
tion of these variables, and thus a behavioral model of the firm will 
be employed. 
To operationalize this model, the traditional engineering de¬ 
finition of efficiency, the output obtained per unit of input, will be 
employed. Solomons states, when discussing this productivity index 
in the context of nonprofit measures of performance, that 
. . . productivity measurement is not quite so simple as this 
in real life because inputs and outputs are seldom, if ever, 
homogeneous. The basic problem, which statistical ingenuity 
has gone a long way toward solving, is to select characteris¬ 
tics of inputs and outputs which can be expressed in homogen¬ 
eous units and which are, therefore, aggreable. Ideally the 
characteristics sought will be physical ones, for it is 
physical productivity which is to be measured. However, it is 
usually impossible to exclude altogether the use of prices and 
unit costs as weights [1965, p. 279]. 
Since factor inputs are not homogeneous in the utility industry, they 
^Williamson entitled his third factor "discretionary profits," 
not professional excellence. Since this factor will be made more robust 
and will encompass more than discretionary profits in this thesis, pro¬ 
fessional excellence seemed the more applicable name. 
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will be homogenized by using dollar surrogates and the resulting costs 
per kilowatt will be used as an index of efficiency in an accounting 
context. 
Methodology 
Extraneous variables. Since the focus of this thesis is on short-run 
efficiency, dealing with those factors controllable by management, the 
derived cost per kilowatt definition measuring efficiency must be 
carefully applied because of various methodological problems. 
First, the utility sector is made up of amorphous firms dif¬ 
fering over many dimensions. To have a comparable measure over any 
sample of firms, the effects of these differences must be extracted. 
Many of these elements have been identified in the literature as well 
as in rate hike hearings and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
III; therefore only a brief mention will be made here. The most common 
problem encountered in any empirical research is vertical integration. 
In the utility industry, firms are involved in varying degrees with 
three distinct activities--generation, transmission, and distribution. 
Another difficulty is that those who generate may use steam, water, 
nuclear or gas turbines to do so, again to any degree. In addition, 
some belong to power exchanges, where they can draw power at peak de¬ 
mands, and to which they may supply power to residential, commercial, 
or industrial users--identified by size of demand. And last, but by 
no means least important, the literature is constantly citing the econ¬ 
omies of scale available to the larger firms. Since it is questionable 
whether these factors are controllable in the short-run, the cost per 
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kilowatt calculations must be purged of their effects. 
Identification of the above variables is not difficult; how¬ 
ever arriving at measurement devices is. Although the variables have 
been discussed in the literature, little has been said on how to quan¬ 
tify them. Consequently one of the major subjects of this thesis and 
one of the most important contributions to research in the public 
utility sector will be the development of a measurement system that 
will quantify the effects of the abovementioned extraneous variables 
on the cost per kilowatt output. 
Of particular interest is the impact of changing prices. If 
dollars are to be compared, an attempt must be made to make them com¬ 
parable. This very topic was explicitly addressed in a recent Finan¬ 
cial Accounting Standards Board pronouncement [1979] and a general 
framework was suggested for treatment of the changing price levels 
problem. This framework will be tested and its success discussed in 
Chapter V. 
Enqogenous variables. Recognizing that the regulatory environment of 
the utility sector affords management discretionary opportunities, 
Williamson's model will be used to identify the behavioral traits which 
are postulated to result. Should management be inefficient and the 
model is correct, the costs per kilowatt, after being purged of all 
extraneous factors, would have a direct relationship, in relative terms, 
to size of staff and emoluments. That is, these factors are incurred 
not for their effect on output, but rather for the satisfaction of per¬ 
sonal goals and thus should rise in a disproportionate manner to output. 
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Conversely, the third factor, professional excellence, should 
have the opposite result. If management chooses to satisfy personal 
goals through this avenue, efficiency should result, therefore driving 
the cost per kilowatt down. An inverse relationship should also be 
exhibited between the professional excellence variable and the above 
size of staff and emoluments variables. 
Other factors which conceivably may affect the cost per kilo¬ 
watt calculations and are controllable to some degree by management 
will also be tested (see footnote 5). Capital asset growth rates have 
been used as evidence of inefficiency in rate hike hearings and will 
be included as an endogenous variable. Likewise payout ratios and 
financial leverage ratios have been suggested as shedding some light 
on efficiency of operations and therefore will be tested for explana¬ 
tory power. 
As was discussed in the extraneous variables section, although 
Williamson has identified his expense preference factors, measurement 
devices are not as obvious. Data as to the effect of size of staff 
are readily available; however, data on emoluments are not reported 
as a separate item. Likewise, professional excellence is a very 
nebulous factor not readily measured. Again, these problems will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
Date base. An additional extraneous variable not previously mentioned 
is the effect of the regulatory environment. Some states constrain 
return on total assets, v/hile other the return on stockholders' 
equity. Some require historical cost figures, v/hile others use re- 
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placement cost estimates. To use a broadly based sample across many 
regulatory environments would subject this research to extreme prob¬ 
lems with respect to comparability of data, over and above those 
mentioned in the previous paragraphs. This problem will be circum¬ 
vented by choosing as a sample only those electric utility companies 
in Massachusetts, since the reporting requirements are standardized 
within the state. 
Analytical model. Due to the nature of the utility industry, this 
necessary sample constraint leads to an additional research problem. 
Statistically, controlling for the effect of a large number of vari¬ 
ables requires a large number of observations. However, due to the 
fact that there are only thirteen electric utility firms in Massachu¬ 
setts, the possibility of any cross-sectional analysis is eliminated. 
Likewise, due to changing environmental conditions within the indus¬ 
try, any time series analysis would be subject to severe criticism. 
To assume stable relationships over any long time series (say, 
twenty years) would be highly questionable and, in fact, has been 
questioned in the few attempts at this type of analysis. 
One method that has been suggested as a solution to the 
limited number of observations problem is the pooled regression model 
which will be employed here. Both time series and cross-sectional 
observations are pooled to attain a more reliable result. However, 
in using this model, procedural questions as to the appropriateness 
of and the proper way of pooling must be addressed. These will be dis¬ 
cussed at length in Chapter IV and again in Chapter V. 
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From a procedural point of view the following steps will be 
taken. 
1. Various means of measurement on both the dependent variables 
and the independent variables will be made. Since the liter¬ 
ature in this area is sparse at best, this stage will be based 
almost solely on logic and reason and therefore will be 
thoroughly discussed. 
2. A correlation analysis will be performed to identify those 
measurement methods which appear most fruitful. Again, recog¬ 
nizing the lack of concrete theories, of particular interest 
will be the signs rather than the strength of the relationships. 
The literature does hypothesize (or at least suggest) the 
type of relationships, but not the strength. For example, 
economies of scale suggest an inverse relationship between the 
cost per kilowatt and size of facilities (e.g., capacity or 
output). However, the strength of the relationship is not 
clear and thus the relative size of the correlation coeffi¬ 
cient is not the question. In addition, relationships between 
the independent variables will be scrutinized (a) to avoid the 
problem of multicol1inearity and (b) to support any secondary 
hypotheses. For example, Williamson's theory suggests an 
inverse relationship between size of staff and professional 
excellence. Likewise, hydropower has been suggested as being 
one of the least costly with respect to generation. Similar 
relationships have been suggested and will be examined. 
3. Through the analysis in step 2 on both relationships between 
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dependent and independent variables and also among the inde¬ 
pendent variables, a set of independent variables and their 
corresponding methods of measurement will be attained. These 
will be analyzed using the pooled regression model with par¬ 
ticular emphasis placed on the endogenous variables. The 
extent of the variation of the costs per kilowatt explained 
by the endogenous variables will be hypothesized as a measure 
of short-run management efficiency in the electric utility 
industry in Massachusetts. 
Data collection. Observations on both the dependent and independent 
variables were gathered from the annual reports on file with the 
Department of Public Utilities in Boston, Massachusetts. The time 
series 1966-1978 was chosen due to (1) the availability of data and 
(2) the stability assumption previously mentioned. By dividing this 
thirteen-year series into a seven- and six-year series and repeating 
the above analysis, the appropriateness of the thirteen-year series 
will be tested with respect to stability. 
Recognizing that Massachusetts is an historical cost juris¬ 
diction, indices will be used in step 1 above to convert historical 
dollars into constant dollars for comparability purposes. All indices 
were taken from the Business Statistics publications of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics. The one excep¬ 
tion is the nuclear fuel index, which is not compiled and therefore 
was generated from data on file with the DPU. 
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The Following Chapters 
Chapter II contains a review of the literature with respect 
to theoretical development and is divided into three sections: first, 
since the classic study on regulation in the utility sector is the 
Averch and Johnson thesis, this will be discussed in detail. Included 
will be subsequent studies it fostered which delve into the underlying 
assumptions of the model. Secondly, the Williamson model will be 
presented and shown to be based on a less stringent set of assumptions 
than the Averch and Johnson model. Finally, the two models will be 
analyzed with respect to the objectives of the research study at 
hand. 
The review of the literature concludes with Chapter III, 
where empirical studies and articles in the utility area are presen¬ 
ted. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the research problems 
plaguing the public utility sector and one result is the generation 
of a list of extraneous variables that must be treated in some manner. 
A few factors under the control of management will also be delineated. 
Chapter IV examines the methodology that is used and concludes 
with specific statements of all hypotheses. Problem areas such as 
construction of variables and measurements thereon, a priori hypoth¬ 
eses as to signs and strength of the relationships between variables, 
and the use of the pooling model will be covered in detail. 
Analysis of the results follows in Chapter V, which is divided 
into two sections. First, the preliminary findings concerning the 
correlation analysis and, thus, the selection of the variables from 
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the regression model is presented. Next the final results of the 
pooled regression model will be enumerated. 
Chapter VI discusses the overall conclusions, limitations 
and implications for further research in the area. Recognizing that 
this model is meant as a prototype and is based on what some may con¬ 
sider a radical theory of the firm, the limitations and implications 
of this thesis will be extensive. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EFFICIENCY MODELS IN THE 
REGULATED SECTOR 
Introduction 
The traditional accounting approach to efficiency measurement 
has been nicely capsulized by Anthony and Reece: "Since profit is 
influenced both by how effective a manager is and also how efficient 
he is, then profit measures both effectiveness and efficiency" [1975, 
p. 774]. Thus, in order to evaluate management performance, the key 
figure the control system must generate is some measure of profit. 
Solomons devoted the majority of his work. Divisional Performance: 
Measurement and Control, to this area and concluded that the proper 
measurements to be used are the excess of net earnings over the cost 
of capital in the short run and the discounted present value of the 
enterprise in the long run. However he did note that in the area of 
regulated public utilities this model is of limited use [1965, p. 124]. 
In general, when dealing with the regulated sectors^ the tra¬ 
ditional accounting measures of evaluating management performance 
based on profitability fail because, since management has only limited 
control over profit, they cannot be held responsible. Thus in a 
regulated industry, performance measurement becomes two dimensional, 
concerned with both effectiveness and efficiency, and their relative 
importance must be judged. The attaching of weights to these two 
measures is beyond the scope of this project; of primary importance 
is the emergence of efficiency as a separate and distinct measure of 
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performance. In rate hike hearings for public utilities, in the 
Chrysler Congressional hearings and in the numerous studies on munici¬ 
pal health care systems, the key question being asked concerns effi¬ 
ciency of operations. 
Efficiency measurement in the regulated sectors has been 
developed theoretically to a high degree; regretfully the majority of 
this work is outside the accounting discipline. The economic liter¬ 
ature has made major contributions in the specific area of regulated 
industries and in the following section the most freqently cited and 
relevant works will be explained and critiqued as to their applica¬ 
bility to this study. Next a well developed theory of the firm ad¬ 
vanced by Williamson [1964, 1970], although general and not concerned 
with the regulated sector, will then be discussed and shown to be, in 
fact, more relevant to this research. 
The Economic Model 
The economic literature has dealt in detail with the problem 
of efficiency measurement in regulated sectors and the classic study 
is that by Averch and Johnson entitled "Behavior of the Firm Under 
Regulatory Constraint" [1965]. Given the assumptions of the neo¬ 
classical theory of the firm, they demonstrate that a constraint on 
the rate of return on capital will cause a firm to develop what they 
call a regulatory bias, resulting in the inefficient use of relatively 
more capital to other inputs than would be the case without the regu¬ 
latory constraint. 
Assuming a simple two-factor input production function. 
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Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the Averch and Johnson thesis. Referring 
to Figure 1, the labor and capital axes are in the horizontal plane 
and the usual interpretation is attached to them: as one moves out 
from the origin along either axis more labor or capital is represented, 
any point in the quadrant, such as C, represents a particular capital 
and labor combination, and plugging the C factor mix into the pro¬ 
duction function will yield some output level. O'. Multiplying the 
price of output by this quantity of output and the prices of inputs 
by the quantities used will yield total revenue and total cost, re¬ 
spectively. Revenue minus cost leaves profit, expressed by the verti¬ 
cal axis in Figure 1. Thus, continuing the example, producing at 
point C results in profit Translating every input-output com¬ 
bination into profit results in the profit hill of Figure 1. Without 
the constraint on the return on capital, the firm would operate at 
the efficient point P where profits are maximized. But, given 
the constraint on capital, which can be viewed as hinged on the labor 
axis, the firm cannot reach and will operate instead at the 
highest profit point attainable. Since the constraint plane rises 
continuously from the labor axis and cuts through the profit hill, 
the highest constrained profit level that can be reached will occur 
along the intersection of the constraint plane and the profit hill at 
that point that is furthest from the labor axis (or along the capital 
axis), in this case at the inefficient point ^max 
efficient and C inefficient will be explained by Figure 2. 
max 
Referring to Figure 2, the labor and capital axis and any 
point in the quadrant between them have the same meaning as in Figure 1 
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And, just as a particular capital and labor combination yields some 
output level, there are many input combinations that will give the 
same output level. The locus of all such input mixes producing the 
constant output O' is represented by the isoquant O'. Isoquants 
representing lower levels of output are closer to the origin, while 
those representing higher levels are further out. The slope of an 
isoquant (which continually changes in this case) at any point is the 
ratio of the marginal physical product of capital to that of labor, 
or MPP^/MPP^. Given a budget and the prices of labor and capital, a 
budget constraint (or isocost line) whose constant slope is the ratio 
of the price of capital to that of labor, can be represented by the 
line B'. As in the case of isoquants, budget constraints representing 
lower budgets are closer to the origin, while those representing 
higher budgets are further out. To attain efficiency, given any 
budget, the goal is to combine inputs so as to maximize output and 
this is achieved in Figure 2 where the budget constraint B' hits the 
highest isoquant it can. O'. This will occur at point P, where the 
budget constraint is just tangent to the isoquant O', meaning that 
their slopes are equal and that the ratio of the marginal productivi¬ 
ties of inputs, MPP^/MPPj^ (as represented by the isoquant), or what 
they're worth in terms of output, is equal to the ratio of the prices 
of inputs, represented by the budget constraint), or what 
they cost. Thus point P is an efficient point. Lower budget con¬ 
straints would be tangent to isoquants closer to the origin, while 
higher budget constraints would be tangent to isoquants further out. 
The locus of tangency for the isocosts and isoquants, representing 
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efficiency, is called the expansion path of Figure 2. 
If one is to project the intersection of the capital con¬ 
straint and the profit hill onto the labor-capital plane--conceptually 
the view one would have by looking directly down from the profit axis 
of Figure 1, the profit curve of Figure 2 results. As stated, the 
firm will elect to operate at C , an inefficient point. The con- 
11IQ A 
straint on the rate of return on capital will cause an excess substi¬ 
tution of capital for labor, resulting in movement from the expansion 
path. For the given output, O', which is constant along the isoquant, 
the point P would be the efficient point--that is, where the output 
is produced at the least cost--but it is not obtainable due to the 
constraint. In addition, the firm would not operate at P', the in¬ 
tersection of the constrained profit curve and the expansion path. 
Although P' is efficient, higher constrained profits can be realized 
by moving to the right along the profit curve until the con¬ 
strained maximum profit point, is reached (remember profits are high¬ 
est further from the labor axis or along the capital axis). The re¬ 
sult in either case is a movement to the right of the expansion path 
as capital is substituted for labor. 
Numerous articles were stimulated by the Averch and Johnson 
study and two, in particular, delved into the underlying assumptions 
of the model. Bailey and Coleman [1971] studied the effects of a 
time lag in the regulatory process and found that the behavior of 
management may be a function of such a lag. Averch and Johnson 
assumed continuous regulation where management had no opportunity for 
excess profits. However, if a lag is introduced, management does 
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have the opportunity for excess profits by violating the regulatory 
constraint. If this is the case, the firm will operate at the effi¬ 
cient point (i.e., point P in Figure 2). Only when the regulatory 
agency discovers this violation would the firm be forced to move from 
this point. 
Zajac [1970] investigated the assumptions of the Classical 
Theory in some detail. First he questioned the static equilibrium 
and perfect information assumptions. Accepting the possibility of 
perfect information for inputs due to engineering technology, he 
studied the opportunities for management discretion assuming uncer¬ 
tainty of the demand function. Essentially two strategies were de¬ 
lineated. Since perfect information as to costs was assumed, manage¬ 
ment could operate at the intersection of the expansion path and the 
return on capital constraint. Thus strategy one was hypothesized as 
seeking out the efficient point, P'. Conversely, strategy two hypoth¬ 
esized that management would attempt to reach that point where profit 
was maximized subject to the constraint. To do this they would ex¬ 
periment with price changes and capital structures striving to reach 
an unknown maximum profit point. Zajac showed that this strategy 
would eventually reach the exact same point as the Averch and Johnson 
findings, C . No conclusion was drawn as to which strategy was 
^ max 
optimal and no empirical evidence was presented. 
Also of interest to Zajac was the profit maximization assump¬ 
tion. By substituting the maximization of stockholders' equity from 
the finance literature, he demonstrated results somewhat contradictory 
to the Averch and Johnson findings. Assuming a constant debt to equity 
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ratio (where the fraction of debt and equity financing is constant 
such that ^ the return on stockholders' equity, r^ is 
r^ = (Pq - wL - if/) / f/ 
where P = price 
q = quantity 
w = labor cost 
L = labor quantity 
i = interest on debt 
K = capital 
f^ = fraction of debt financing 
fg = fraction of equity financing 
Given the constraint on capital is less than some percentage, c, 
(Pq - wL) / K ^ c, then r^ can be rewritten 
- «L)/K - iVfg 
To maximize stockholders' return the manager would operate where the 
constraint on capital is just met. Again, referring to Figure 2, any 
point on the intersection of the constrain and the profit hill would 
satisfy this condition, thus maximizing stockholders' equity. 
As before, when such an opportunity set is available, hypoth¬ 
eses as to management strategies were suggested. First, recognizing 
the probability of perfect information as to factor inputs, manage¬ 
ment could seek the efficient point P' (see Figure 3). However, 
another plausible strategy was to maximize output (e.g., to increase 
market share). Given this strategy, the firm would operate at the 
tangency of the outermost isoquant, and the constrained profit 
curve, at point P'' (see Figure 3). Since this input is to the 
29 
Figure 3. The constrained profit curve projected on the 
capital and labor axes—return on stockholders' equity substituted 
for profit. 
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northwest of P''', the most efficient point at which to produce 0 , 
it means that too much labor and too little capital is being used. 
Thus this strategy would lead to conclusions opposite to those of 
Averch and Johnson and it can be shown mathematically that, as long 
as c ^ i, this substitution of labor (or other factor inputs) for 
capital will result using this model. 
Two empirical studies have investigated the Averch and Johnson 
hypothesis. Since the definition of inefficiency was variance from 
the expansion path, a production function was defined ex ante, first 
order conditions were derived, and the ratios of the marginal physi¬ 
cal products of factor inputs were compared to the ratios of the 
marginal costs. If equal, the firms were on the expansion path, and 
Averch and Johnson were disproven. 
Courville [1974] assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
Q. = aVk^F^c^ (K = capital, F = fuel, L = labor) and found that the 
ratio of the marginal product of capital to that of fuel was not 
equal to the ratio of the marginal costs, thus supporting Averch and 
Johnson, flowever, he noted that the Cobb-Douglas function was chosen 
only because it outperformed other alternative production functions 
and his results may thereby be subject to specification error. In 
addition, tlie marginal cost of capital was estimated using the average 
yield to maturity for AAA public utility bonds for the preceding year. 
Tills is a questionable procedure which subjects his findings to speci- 
tication bias. 
Likewise, Spann [1974] assumed the marginal cost of capital 
to l)e the same for all fii'ins in his sample and assumed other variables 
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to be estimated by overall industry averages. As above, while his 
results supported the Averch and Johnson hypothesis, specification 
problems must be recognized. 
A Behavioral Model 
Although dealing with neither efficiency nor regulated public 
utilities, a much more indirect track that was suggested as readily 
applicable to them is the work of Oliver Williamson [1964, 1970] con¬ 
cerning the impact of the opportunity for discretion on management 
behavior. Essentially he has developed a theory of the firm that is 
dependent upon market conditions and diffusion of shareholders rather 
than the strict competitive market assumptions of the classical (or 
neoclassical) model. 
The idea that as one relaxes the assumptions of the classical 
model factors influencing management performance change is not new or 
radical. In the competitive market, any departure from profit maxi¬ 
mization (that is, straying from the expansion path) leads to extinc- 
tion--the natural selection theory. Yet in 1932 Berle and Mean ques¬ 
tioned 
. . . have we any justification for assuming that those in 
control of a modern corporation will also choose to operate 
it in the best interests of the stockholders? The answer 
to that question will depend on the degree to which the 
self-interest of those in control may run parallel to the 
interests of ownership and, insofar as they differ, on the 
checks and balances on the use of power which may be es¬ 
tablished by political, economic, or social conditions 
[1932, p. 121]. 
Stating it slightly differently, Keynes [1931, p. 316] said that ". 
. . when stockholders are almost entirely disassociated from manage- 
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merit, the direct interest of the latter in making a profit becomes 
quite secondary." And, in 1935, Hicks suggested that the "... best 
of all monopoly profit is the quiet life" [1935, p. 694]. Calling 
his model the Discretionary Theory of the Firm, Williamson abandoned 
the stewardship assumption of management behavior and replaced it with 
a self-interest assumption. In reviewing the literature, he then 
identified two approaches, called "Realism in Process" and "Realism 
in Motivation." Each of these will be briefly discussed and then the 
Williamson model will be presented. 
Realism in Process deals with the relationship between be¬ 
havior and the business environment. An excellent example of a study 
in this area is the Cyert and March [1963] "Budgetary Slack" model. 
Defined as the difference between the total assets available to the 
firm and the total necessary to maintain the firm, budgetary slack 
is hypothesized to be a function of the formal control system of the 
organization. 
If the control system is rigid and unyielding, the manager 
will build slack by understating revenues and overstating costs. 
There are two reasons for this accumulation of slack; in times of 
prosperity, these slack items satisfy personal goals not otherwise 
attainable through the formal organization and, in hard times, the 
slack can be reconverted providing ". . .a pool of emergency re¬ 
sources that enable aspirations to be achieved" [Onsi, 1963, p. 536]. 
Thus slack leads to the satisfaction of personal goals in good times 
and minimizes stress in bad times. 
Should this model be used, the entity concept would have to 
33 
be expanded to encompass the regulatory agency. If this theory is 
correct, the individual utilities would build slack into their bud¬ 
gets as a result of the rigid and unyielding control system of the 
regulatory agency. The problem area would be the empirical testing 
of this model. 
Empirical tests usually measure the relationship between 
attitude toward slack and attitude toward the control system, atti¬ 
tude toward the budgetary system and the slack detection system. An 
example of such tests is the Onsi study [1963] where factor analysis, 
with slack attitude as the dependent variable and attitudes toward 
the control system and budgetary system as independent variables, was 
employed. Data were gathered using personal interviews and question¬ 
naires. Since the data were confidential as to respondent and firm, 
his results cannot be considered startling. Eighty percent of the 
managers interviewed explicitly confirmed the existence of slack, and 
the Cyert and March model was found to be an accurate portrayal of the 
budgetary process. 
However, any result using this approach has to be viewed with 
some skepticism. In that it is almost impossible to conceal the in¬ 
tent of such a study, any participation (personal interview and/or 
questionnaire) is susceptible to subject bias. Given the pressure on 
management of utilities, it is doubtful that any type of objective 
participation can be expected. 
Realism in Motivation involves the study of management be¬ 
havior as a function of opportunity for management discretion. An 
excellent example of studies in this group is the work of Simon 
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[1957], who investigated the effects of personal goals on decision 
making. He rejected the assumption of "Economic Man" seeking to 
maximize profits and instead suggested a "Social Man" concept describ¬ 
ing an adaptive organism constantly trying to reach an equilibrium 
with regard to personal goals in an ever changing environment. Maxi¬ 
mization of profit was not the primary goal of the manager unless he 
was faced with pure competition where any other behavior would lead 
to extinction. 
Two additional studies extended this discretionary theory in¬ 
to the regulated sector of the economy. Kaysen [1960] found that 
protection from competition resulted in a wide range of discretionary 
choice for management. As long as stockholders were satisfied, 
management could concern itself with other personal, nonprofit goals. 
Alchian and Kessel [1967] developed a theoretical model for regulated 
firms which again resulted in the maximization of personal goals 
rather than profits. 
The Expense Preference Model _ 
To develop his model, Williamson first reviewed the liter¬ 
ature to identify the major intermediate determinants of behavior and 
found that the most common elements were salary, security, status, 
power, prestige, social service, and professional excellence. Next 
these were grouped into three factors called "expense preferences" 
which he explained were 
. . . incurred not merely for their contribution to production 
(if any) but, in addition, for the manner in which they enhance 
the individual and collective objectives of managers [1964, p.33J. 
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The first factor was size of staff which, theoretically, loaded heav¬ 
ily on security, status, power, prestige and, to some extent, pro¬ 
fessional excellence. The second, emoluments, was concerned with 
compensation over and above a competitive salary and was directly 
related to status and prestige. Discretionary profits, as measured 
by the amount in excess of that necessary to satisfy stockholders, 
was the third factor and was thought to be a function of security and 
professional excellence. 
The thrust of Williamson's study was the theoretical develop¬ 
ment of an alternative theory of the firm, linking behavior with 
opportunity for discretion; that is, as stated earlier, with market 
conditions and diffusion of shareholders. Only a small amount of 
data was presented and even that was described as "suggestive" rather 
than "supportive." For example, three case studies were discussed 
which were clearly described as extremes. In each situation, an 
established company showing stable growth patterns over a number of 
years was beset by adversity (e.g., a dramatic drop in sales or earn¬ 
ings). The actions taken revealed an underlying organization as 
hypothesized by the discretionary behavior model. "Expense preference" 
factors were immediately slashed; staff was cut back (in one case by 
42%) and emoluments (e.g., planes, chauffeurs, dining privileges, 
private secretaries) discontinued with little effect on output. In 
three divisions of one large multidivisional firm where this was not 
possible (i.e., staffs and emoluments were already at a minimum), the 
managers were described as "exceptional performers"; thus the logical 
explanation was that they were motivated by recognition through 
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achievement rather than by large staffs or emoluments. 
In addition, an attempt was made to explain variations in 
levels of top executive compensation with explanatory variables such 
as concentration ratios, barriers to entry, diffusion of shareholders 
and preferences of management. Using somewhat questionable measure¬ 
ment devices, Williamson did find that all signs were as hypothesized 
and all correlations significant at the two-and-one-half percent 
level. Recognizing the methodological problems, he again stressed 
that these results could only be viewed as suggestive; little confi¬ 
dence in a statistical context was expressed. In a subsequent work. 
Corporate Control and Business Behavior [1970], Williamson documented 
several studies that once again were classified as suggestive, since 
they did not test his hypothesis directly. 
Critique as to Applicability 
The Averch and Johnson thesis is well known and recognized as 
the classic work in this area. However its focus is on segment 
efficiency rather than management efficiency. Factor inputs to the 
production process are not controllable in the short run and there¬ 
fore any inefficiencies revealed by the model would not necessarily 
be due to current management decisions. In addition, the neoclassical 
assumptions are not applicable to the public utility sector. Manage¬ 
ment is insulated from competitive market pressures and therefore 
faces a spectrum of discretionary behavioral opportunities not recog¬ 
nized in the neoclassical foundations. Some have rebutted this argu¬ 
ment by noting that, although they are insulated from the product 
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market, management is not insulated from the capital market. There¬ 
fore discretionary expenses will be reflected by higher prices (i.e., 
penalties) in the capital markets. As noted by Williamson, Baumol 
has examined this argument extensively and found it to be lacking. 
He concludes that infrequent use of the exchanges as sources of 
capital has limited their ability to penalize and he did not see 
any reason for this to change in the near future. In summary Baumol 
stated 
If we look to the stock market as a direct regulator of the 
efficiency of America's corporate enterprise, we must find 
other means for it to accomplish this assignment [1965, 
p. 76]. 
Furthermore, to operationalize the economic definition of 
efficiency is difficult at best. Both Courville and Spann noted that 
choice of production functions was subjective and specification 
errors likely. To correctly test this hypothesis marginal costs are 
needed, but they are not available and the use of industry averages 
as surrogates for marginal costs is highly suspect. In short, speci¬ 
fication errors would cause any results from research based on this 
assumption to be severely questioned. 
On the other hand, the behavioral model, although not as 
elegant theoretically, does seem more appropriate. It is short-run 
in focus and deals directly with factors that are controllable by 
management. This, in fact, is the essence of the model. 
Also, as stringent as the economic model is with respect to 
underlying assumptions, the behavioral model is flexible. There are 
no assumptions as to necessary market conditions; in fact, the model 
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hypothesizes behavior ^ a function of market conditions. Man is 
not constrained to maximize profits; rather his behavior is viewed as 
being totally adaptive with respect to the environment he encounters. 
The one weakness of the model is the almost total lack of 
solid empirical research supporting it. Williamson readily admits 
that the cases he used and the works he cited can only be classified 
as suggestive. Yet it cannot be overlooked that the model is based 
upon voluminous studies done by researchers well known in their fields, 
all of which has been extensively tested. In this research effort, 
Williamson's model will be tested empirically. 
CHAPTER III 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON EXTRANEOUS VARIABLES 
Introduction 
The Williamson model reveals expense preference factors that 
are theorized to be short-run determinates of behavior. Given an 
environment where these can be manifested, it is hypothesized that 
they will affect efficiency in a predetermined manner. By establish¬ 
ing that these factors do influence the cost per kilowatt in the 
prescribed manner, the hypothesis would be supported and the expense 
preference factors endorsed as measures of short-run efficiency. 
However, to establish this relationship, an ex post research 
design is required which must be carefully constructed if it is to be 
effective. Any factor, although irrelevant from a short-run view¬ 
point, if it has an impact on the cost per kilowatt, must be speci¬ 
fically treated. To the extent that the costs per kilowatt are 
purged of the effects of these extraneous factors, the model should 
succeed in establishing the existence or non-existence of the pre¬ 
determined relationships. The purpose of this chapter is to review 
the literature in an attempt to identify these extraneous factors and 
their hypothesized effect on the costs per kilowatt. Measurement 
problems will be discussed in the following chapter. 
The Variables 
Regulatory environment. Livingstone [1967], in his research on func- 
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tional fixation, noted that regulatory processes across all states are 
not consistent. Some states regulate return on capital assets, while 
others return on stockholders' equity. Some recognize current costs 
with respect to plant and equipment, while others recognize historical 
cost. There is no one uniform standard for reporting as one crosses 
state boundaries.^ The effect of this variable on the cost per kilo¬ 
watt cannot be generalized; it would depend on the standards set by 
the particular jurisdiction. 
Technology and economies of scale. The economic literature in gener¬ 
al, and the rate hike hearings in particular, refer to the alleged 
availability of economies of scale and to technological advances being 
made. Courville stated: "The literature on electricity generation 
indicates that there was significant technological progress over the 
last thirty years or so . . . it also indicates the existence of in¬ 
creasing returns to scale" [1974, p. 63]. It is thought that the 
larger and newer the plant, the more cost efficient it will be due 
to these advantages. Little data have been cited to support these 
contentions. And, in fact, in a recent rate hike hearing, the hear¬ 
ings officer for the DPI) stated 
. . . The trend of technology has also changed. Until the 
1970's, the industry was able to meet increased cost by 
economies of scale and technological change. Important 
Some might say that there are a multitude of uniform stan¬ 
dards and that much depends upon for what agency the report is being 
prepared. For example, Boston Edison files reports which cover much 
the same material to the Federal Power Commission (FPC), the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC), and finally, the Department of Public Utilities in Massachu¬ 
setts . 
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economies of scale had been realized in the generation of 
power. By the 1970's, at the latest, this long term trend 
was at an end [1977, p. 4]. 
Thus, although these factors seem self-evident, they may have little 
impact on the cost per kilowatt. As a result, it is hypothesized 
that both technology and size should have either an inverse relation¬ 
ship or no relationship at all to cost per kilowatt. 
Vertical integration. Both Courville [1974] and Spann [1974] identi¬ 
fied vertical integration as a major research problem if any type of 
comparative analysis is done in the utility industry. Electric 
utilities are engaged in two distinct activities, generation and 
distribution, and each firm may be involved in each activity to a 
varying degree. For example, it is common for one firm solely to 
generate and sell its output wholesale with the second firm acting 
solely as a distributor. Conversely, it is also common for a utility 
to generate some portion, if not all, of its own needs and to distri¬ 
bute as well. In addition, a third activity, transmission of the 
electricity from generation site to distribution point, is sometimes 
coupled with the generation activity and at other times with the dis¬ 
tribution activity. There is no pattern or rule; each utility can 
enter into each activity to any degree. A priori it would seem that 
as a firm becomes more vertically integrated, the cost per kilowatt 
should rise in recognition of the additional services being provided 
the consumer. 
Type of generation. It is not enough to identify the activity; 
generation must be further identified by source of power--fossi1 fuel 
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(coal or oil), hydropower, gas turbine, or nuclear fission.^ Again 
both Courville [1974] and Spann [1974] noted that the generation mix 
is thought to have a direct bearing on the cost per kilowatt. Like¬ 
wise, Moody's Public Utility Manual specifically warns of the dangers 
of comparing companies with dissimilar properties. In the controver¬ 
sies involving nuclear power, advocates have stated how clean (the 
ratio of energy consumed to energy produced) nuclear power is versus 
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other sources. However, since little empirical data are available, 
specific hypotheses as to the effects of generation mix will not be 
made. 
Market mix. The sale of electricity involves four markets: a whole¬ 
sale market called "resale" and three retail markets--residential, 
commercial (small businesses), and industrial (larger industries). 
The larger the percentage of resale, the lower the cost per kilowatt 
should be, again due to the minimum of service provided the consumer 
--i.e., recognizing the transaction as a wholesale one. Thus market 
mix should be highly correlated with the aforementioned activity mix 
and, if nothing else, can be used as a good cross check. 
^It is recognized that other types of generation are possible, 
but in New England their total effect is negligible. 
^It should be noted that the area of social costs is entirely 
ignored in the study. For example, the media have noted the increased 
feasibility of small hydroelectric plants due to the free fuel inputs 
as compared to other generation types. Environmentalists, however, 
are quick to point out the geothermal pollution and the social costs 
due to the loss of the natural free flowing river which, although they 
cannot be measured, are nevertheless real. 
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Variability of demand. 
Generation. Due to the nature of the good, demand for elec¬ 
tricity varies within a period. Regardless of the extent of varia¬ 
bility, due to charter conditions, the utility must be prepared to 
meet the maximum demand called the peak demand. For instance, in a 
recent hearing before the DPU [1976], Boston Edison attempted to 
justify the need for additional generation capacity (Pilgrim II) by 
providing statistics on the growth of peak demand for the summer 
periods. It was projected that short periods, called needle peaks 
(characterized as hot, humid days when the heavy use of air condi¬ 
tioners causes excessive demand), would necessitate Pilgrim 11's be¬ 
ing on line by 1983. The intervenors argued that this would result 
in large charges for excess and/or idle capacity in off peak periods. 
Thus variability is of prime importance and is thought to have a 
major impact on the cost per kilowatt for generation. 
Distribution. Although not as critical, variability of de¬ 
mand can also be analyzed from an end market viewpoint. When discus¬ 
sing factors of importance in the utility sector, Moody's [1978] 
noted the significance of the residential sales with respect to 
stability. The higher the residential sales, the more stable the 
demand; conversely, the higher the industrial sales, the more variable 
the demand. As a result, it is hypothesized that the higher the 
industrial proportion, the higher the variability of demand and con¬ 
sequently the higher the cost per kilowatt reflecting the idle distri¬ 
bution plant. 
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Pools. By linking all generating utilities in a loose network called 
the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL), average capital utilization 
ratios can be increased. For example, rather than acquiring facili¬ 
ties that would only be used during peak demand, a utility could 
rely on the pool to meet these rare occurrences by simply drawing 
the excess needed from the pool network. Likewise, those having 
excess capacity would stand ready to supply energy if the need arose. 
Which facility to call upon to meet pool demand is dictated by data 
kept centrally on all pool members--the one that would supply power 
at the cheapest cost is automatically chosen. Consequently, pool 
membership should draw the cost per kilowatt down. 
Specific price level problems. In any type of comparative analysis 
on dollar aggregates, recognition must be given to the impact of 
changing price levels. The recent statements of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 33 [1979] covered this area in detail and concluded 
with a general framework on how to address this problem. Essential¬ 
ly, two price levels are of importance: (1) general, which has to do 
with the changes in purchasing power of the dollar in the market as a 
whole; and (2) specific, which is concerned with changes in the pur¬ 
chasing power of the dollar due to shifts in consumer preferences in 
identified submarkets. To arrive at proper measures of income, both 
price levels must be treated. On the other hand, the balance sheet, 
if it is to be of any use, must show assets and equities at their 
current value, which recognizes only specific price levels. Of impor¬ 
tance to this thesis is the definition of current values with respect 
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to plant and equipment. Three possibilities are suggested for those 
assets defined as used and useful (i.e., not to be sold). The first 
is reproduction cost, the cost to replace the exact same asset, 
which can then be adjusted for depreciation if desired. The second 
is replacement cost which is defined as that amount of cash required 
to purchase the best available asset that would perform the same func¬ 
tion, again adjusted for depreciation if desired. The last, current 
cost, concerns replacing the services of the asset rather than the 
asset itself and therefore recognizes technological change. Whereas 
replacement cost could result in the best available asset being more 
efficient by providing more services or services at a lower cost, 
current cost is concerned only with replacing the exact same services. 
Technological advance, therefore, could cause wide disparity between 
replacement and current cost. The accompanying pronouncement con¬ 
cluded that current cost was the proper current value measure for 
plant and equipment. 
For this thesis, general price levels are irrelevant since 
they would affect all utilities in the same manner. Of importance is 
the effects of the specific price levels, expressly in two areas. 
Plant and equipment. The importance of both the type of 
activity and the type of generation was discussed in preceding sec¬ 
tions. In the following chapter it will be suggested that a logical 
way to measure these factors is by the relative dollars invested in 
each activity and/or generation type. However, this may be of little 
benefit, and may even obscure the true relationships, if dollars are 
simply aggregated and compared. The dollars invested m plant assets 
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in years past versus those invested more currently are not additive. 
Recognition must be given to the effect of specific price level in¬ 
creases in the utility sector if any type of relative dollar invest¬ 
ment analysis is to be done. Only after these investment dollars are 
made comparable will the analysis be beneficial. 
Factor input costs. Of the factor inputs, only labor can be 
ignored with respect to the changing price levels, since all utili¬ 
ties in the study would be affected in the same manner. However, 
capital and fuel factors must be specifically treated. 
To analyze costs per kilowatt for the various utilities with¬ 
out adjusting the depreciation portion therein would be tantamount to 
making the implicit assumption that all assets for all firms were ac¬ 
quired at the same time. As was discussed in the prior sections, 
recognition must be given to the fact that this assumption is most 
likely false; the depreciation charges for assets acquired in more 
recent periods should be higher, reflecting the increased price levels, 
and vice versa. However, technology may confound this effect (at 
least up to the 1970's) by driving the cost of new acquisition down. 
The problem is an interesting one which may have a very simple solu¬ 
tion (to be discussed in the following chapter). 
In addition, expert witnesses and hearing officers both have 
stressed that the relative fuel input costs must be recognized when 
costs per kilowatt are compared. Although all have increased drama¬ 
tically over the past years (see Appendix B), the rates of increase 
are in some cases substantially different. For example, both oil and 
coal have increased almost five hundred percent over the past thirteen 
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years (oil, 474%; coal, 452%), with oil making a massive jump in 1973, 
while in coal there was more of a steady rise over the entire span. 
On the other hand, nuclear fuel remained relatively stable until 1975 
and then increased more than seventy percent in the next three years. 
And gas, although increasing two hundred fifty percent over the same 
time span, did so at a relatively constant rate, excepting a fifty 
percent increase in 1973. Thus, although they have all increased, if 
the cost per kilowatt is to be compared, the relative increases of 
the fuel inputs must be treated. 
To Close 
The fact that this chapter is so short should in no way re¬ 
flect upon its importance. The very reason that the literature re¬ 
view has been designated a separate chapter is to emphasize its im¬ 
portance. 
The methodology discussed in the following chapter will 
reveal a pooling model where the costs per kilowatt for the thirteen 
electric utility companies will be compared over a thirteen-year span. 
Although a pooling model has not been employed in testimony before 
the DPU, numerous time series and cross-sectional models have been. 
The problems discussed in this chapter have been cited in numerous 
cases as substantiation for the lack of any credibility given to the 
results of such studies. For example, in Western Massachusetts 18204, 
the DPU notes 
... in a period as markedly inflationary as the past few 
years, reliance on an earlier period (sic 1965-1975) for 
this purpose (sic growth rate projects) is likely to be ill- 
fated [p. 75]. 
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Again in Boston Edison 18515, the DPU commented on testimony given by 
a Mr. Miller pertaining to a study on cost of capital, utilizing a 
sample of sixty-nine public utilities 
. . . The 69 companies cover a wide range as to every test 
that is applicable to them. To ignore these variations by 
suggesting that the average can reasonably be applied to 
each of the companies is a method that would only appeal to 
Procrustes. Individual differences are not to be so lightly 
disregarded [p. 72]. 
Finally, of the studies cited in recent rate hike hearings, one that 
is most similar in a methodological sense to this thesis is by a 
Mr. Marcussen from Theodore Barry & Associates (a firm specializing 
in operational auditing), who compares various ratios concerning work 
force management for Boston Edison to ten other utilities from across 
the nation over a short (but unspecified) number of years. Noting 
that identification of the sampling technique employed was not clari¬ 
fied, the DPU concluded 
. . . From yet another analytical perspective, Mr. Marcussen's 
comparison of the Company with ten other utility companies 
is almost as unsatisfactory. No details are offered as to 
size, generation mix, customer density or operating environ¬ 
ment. The study's conclusion that Boston Edison's practices 
compare favorably with those generally found in the 
electric utility industry is not quantified [1977, p. 83]. 
For this research project to achieve any credence, the prob¬ 
lem areas cited above must be clearly delineated and treated. In 
addition, little empirical research has been mentioned with respect 
to the relative importance of these factors; their major support is 
intuition and logic. Any research finding, although extraneous to 
the primary objective of this study, with respect to this area should 
prove valuable in the electric utility area in general. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The problem that has been discussed in the prior chapters 
deals with the effect of regulation on management efficiency. By 
guaranteeing the firms a specific return on equity, regulation affects 
management behavior, but in what fashion? The argument that has been 
developed is synopsized by Kenneth Arrow: 
In general, any system, which, in effect, insures against 
adverse final outcomes, automatically reduces the incen¬ 
tives to good decision making [1969, p. 55]. 
However, the development to this stage has been theoretical and/or 
speculative; no empirical evidence has been presented which demon¬ 
strates the inefficiency that is alleged to exist due to the oppor¬ 
tunities for discretionary behavior afforded management. A number 
of approaches could be advocated as the next logical step. 
First, recognizing the weaknesses of the regulatory process 
and accepting the behavioral implications of the discretionary be¬ 
havior model, the process itself could be changed. Some might sug¬ 
gest that the constraints be altered or even removed and a competitive 
market reinstituted. There appears to be some sentiment that less 
regulation is better as witnessed by the recent relaxing of controls 
in the airline, interstate commerce and oil industries. However, the 
design of a better regulatory system is far beyond the scope of this 
work. The regulatory system as it exists will be assumed and emphasis 
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will be placed, instead, on the design of a control system which 
recognizes the behavioral implications of the regulatory process. 
The next logical question is: Should the control system be 
external or internal to the individual utility? Williamson suggests 
an internal control system constructed on an organizational design 
which promotes least cost behavior and, thus, self regulation. In 
his summary he states 
. . . discretionary behavior is a function of discretionary 
opportunities and situational incentives. The M-form 
organization alters behavior by changing the situational 
(role) incentives at the top and by limiting the discretion¬ 
ary opportunities available to lower level participants 
through the operation of a powerful internal compliance 
machinery [1970, p. 175]. 
Essentially he reasoned that, by divisionalizing a large firm, 
an internal subeconomy would materialize where resource allocations 
and rewards would be made based on relative performance. Thus his 
M, or multidivision, form promotes competition within a firm and, 
therefore, approaches the neoclassical economic model. Efficiency is 
reintroduced through organizational design rather than market struc¬ 
ture. Again, as logical and intuitive as this model is, organization¬ 
al design is far beyond the scope of this work and is noted only as 
a unique and interesting way to deal with the problem at hand. 
The most pragmatic approach, given the actions of the utility 
firms in Massachusetts, would seem to be the development of a control 
system external to the individual utility. Placing the burden of 
proof on the individual firms has not been successful; therefore more 
stringent methods are needed. 
One technique may be to require more information, if it is 
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thought to be useful, through additional mandatory disclosures. For 
example, in 1978 the Securities Exchange Commission, in Releases No. 
33-6003 and 33-5949, require that information on management remunera¬ 
tion, especially any benefits not directly connected to operations, 
and management security holdings, which were hitherto spread through¬ 
out the annual filings of the S-K forms, now be compiled and reported 
under one heading in item four. This ruling was further clarified in 
Releases No. 33-6027 and 33-6166 the following year. Likewise The 
Company Act of 1967 in Great Britain required separate reporting of 
all contributions, employee remuneration and exports. It was recog¬ 
nized that theoretically 
A proper system would require measurement not just of costs 
to the entity but of both costs and benefits to society of 
particular programmes or units and of the entity as a whole 
[Perks and Gray, 1979, p. 22]. 
Yet this information, even though not complete, was thought to be in 
the public interest and, at least, a step in the right direction. 
Although this method is in common use today, it must be 
viewed with some skeptism. Regulatory compliance costs are close to 
one-half-million dollars for larger utilities in Massachusetts today. 
Since additional disclosure requirements would inevitably lead to 
higher expenses, which, in turn, would be passed on to the consumers 
in the form of rate increases, this approach is not a true solution. 
Simply stating that the information is thought to be of public in¬ 
terest is not enough; before the costs of compiling and reporting 
are incurred, the benefits of such disclosures should be substantiated. 
This thesis does advocate that additional items be reported. 
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specifically the expense preference items discussed prior, but not on 
an ad hoc basis. Rather than just suggesting that some information 
is of value or will "benefit society", this research paper states the 
exact nature of the information, the hypothesized relationship it has 
to efficiency and then tests this relationship empirically. By 
establishing the theory base which justifies the additional disclo¬ 
sures, a cost benefit criterion can be applied. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the analytical tech- 
nigues employed to ascertain the expected benefits from the addition¬ 
al disclosures that are advocated. The first section deals with the 
measurement technigues used on both the dependent and independent 
variables, with the second section then discussing the procedure 
employed to choose between these alternative measures. The pooled 
regression model, used to examine the relationship between the costs 
per kilowatt and the expense preference factors, while simultaneously 
controlling for the effects of the extraneous variables, is then ex¬ 
plained, and the chapter concludes with a specific statement of all 
hypotheses to be tested--both primary and secondary. 
Variable Measurement 
Dependent variable. Cost per kilowatt, the dependent variable, seems 
almost self-explanatory; yet there are at least two ways to construct 
this variable. The first is to simply total all costs--categorized 
in the annual filings as operating, maintenance, property taxes, 
depreciation and interest--and then divide by the kilowatt output. 
By using the dollar surrogates, as Solomons suggested, heterogeneous 
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inputs are converted into homogeneous units--donars--but are they 
truly additive? Since Massachusetts is a historical cost jurisdiction, 
the depreciation charge reflects a weighted average of acquisition 
year dollars and this could add considerable variation to the cost 
per kilowatt computation. To purge these calculations of this ex¬ 
traneous variation the depreciation charge could be converted to 
current year dollars for each utility by using specific price level 
indices for each year (i.e., 1966 to 1978). However, because the 
variation of the costs per kilowatt caused by depreciation is not 
controllable by management in the short run and is, therefore, 
irrelevant to the primary objective of this work, depreciation can 
also be simply eliminated from the cost per kilowatt computation. 
Since the latter approach is far easier, a second cost per kilowatt 
calculation which ignores the depreciation charge will also be used 
(i.e., operating expense plus maintenance plus property taxes plus 
interest divided by kilowatt output). 
Independent variables. 
Endogenous. Chapter II covered Williamson's expense prefer¬ 
ence items on a conceptual level and left the more pragmatic and dif¬ 
ficult problem of measurement for this chapter. As has been stated 
in prior sections, since little empirical testing of his model has 
been done, Williamson's factors have not been quantified and the 
measurement devices that will be constructed in order to accomplish 
this task are based solely on logic and reason. The endogenous 
variables to be developed are size of staff, emoluments, professional 
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excellence (all based upon Williamson) and capital expansion (a new 
variable). 
The first factor, size of staff, can be measured any number 
of ways. Of importance, however, are relative rather than absolute 
measures. It is not enough to measure staff expense in dollars, it 
must be related to some causal indicator. Logically, salary and 
wages of staff per kilowatt output or as a percentage of sales should 
be satisfactory. Such data are available and therefore each will be 
generated and tested. 
Even though it is as clearly defined as size of staff, emolu¬ 
ments is more difficult to measure due to the lack of availability of 
data. Total compensation is buried in any number of accounts^^ (e.g., 
management salaries, pensions and benefits, miscellaneous expense) 
and cannot be reconstructed. Williamson did recognize this problem 
and used top management salary as a surrogate when discussing empiri¬ 
cal studies in this area. But even this figure is not always avail¬ 
able. All utilities in Massachusetts are not separate entities; many 
share a common management through holding companies (e.g.. Northeast 
Utilities, Eastern Utility Associate, New England Power Service 
Company). Although operated as distinct segments, a flat management 
fee levied by the holding company is reported in lieu of top manage¬ 
ment salaries. Since this fee may contain any variety of items (e.g., 
a charge for invested capital), top management salaries for these 
companies are sometimes not available. Nonetheless, where these 
^*^As was noted previously, disclosure of this information is 
now required for those firms under the jurisdiction of the SEC. 
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figures are attainable, they will be tested for their effect on the 
costs per kilowatt. As above, with relative rather than absolute 
measures being called for, top management salary per kilowatt and as 
a percentage of sales will be used. 
Williamson's third factor, discretionary profits, has been 
expanded and entitled professional excellence. Regardless of what it 
is called, measurement of this factor is difficult due to its lack of 
substance. Williamson argued that its existence would be manifested 
by discretionary profits--that amount which is over and above the 
minimum level of stockholder satisfaction. However, how to measure 
stockholder satisfaction was not mentioned. 
Clearly this factor attempts to identify those managers that 
strive to attain recognition (self-actualization?) not by the size 
of their staff or by their emoluments but rather by their achievement. 
Since return on equity is constrained at 13%, any type of profit 
measure seems a poor index of performance. Yet few utilities yield 
the constrained 13% return on equity and it may be that this factor, 
achieving the allowed 13% return, does, in fact, indicate profession¬ 
al excellence. Thus one measure that will be tested is the difference 
between the actual return on equity and 13%; the closer this is to 
zero, the better the performance of management.^^ 
Recognizing that any measure based on profit is weak, another 
measure of professional excellence that may be helpful is return on 
^^Thirteen percent is not an absolute. As was noted previous¬ 
ly, Boston Edison was allowed an additional one-half-of-one percent^ 
as an incentive to be efficient. Likewise, there are slight variations 
for other utilities which should have no material effect. 
56 
sales. Although all returns on equity are theoretically equal, a 
management motivated by recognition may attempt to earn this return 
in a least cost manner, thereby maximizing return on sales. A high 
return on sales could indicate professional excellence and therefore 
will be so tested (see footnote 11). 
An additional variable, not developed by Williamson, may also 
be germane with respect to management behavior. In the DPU hearings 
concerning the need for the Pilgrim II power plant, it was insinuated 
that the management's desire to expand cannot be substantiated by de¬ 
mand requirements, but rather reflects the desire for prestige, 
status and power. A rationale of "bigger is better" was used to 
characterize management. Although existing facilities are not con¬ 
trollable by management, expansion is controllable and of concern 
here. 
To quantify this behavior, the growth rate relative to excess 
capacity must somehow be compared. Since this accusation has to do 
with the generation activity, a percentage rate of growth can be ob¬ 
tained by dividing the change in capacity for a year by the total 
capacity for that year. Likewise the excess capacity rate or percen¬ 
tage can be computed by subtracting demand from capacity and dividing 
by capacity. To then arrive at a measure of unwarranted growth, u 
for short, the growth rate is multiplied by the excess capacity rate. 
That is 
Unwarranted Growth = Growth Rate X Excess Capacity Rate 
Capacity^-Capacity^l Capacity^-Demand^ 
Capacity^ Capacity^ 
X 
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and the larger the u factor, the greater the unwarranted growth. For 
example, since these two rates are multiplied, if the excess capacity 
percentage is small, then any growth would not be unwarranted and u 
would be small. Likewise if the excess capacity rate is large, but 
the growth rate is small, then again u would be small, indicating no 
unwarranted growth. It is only when both the excess capacity and 
growth rates are large that the unwarranted growth variable, u, is 
large. Thus, if the above measurement device does measure the "bigger 
is better" characterization of management, a positive correlation with 
cost per kilowatt is expected. 
The influence of these factors on the costs per kilowatt are 
of primary concern. If it can be demonstrated that they do affect 
the costs per kilowatt in the hypothesized manners, it would then be 
management's task to explain why they are not short-run indications 
of efficiency. However, since management's prevailing argument 
against any statement about efficiency is that firms are not compar¬ 
able, the next section rebuts this allegation by explaining how 
comparability is achieved via controlling for extraneous factors. 
Extraneous. Extraneous variables are a common problem in any 
type of research and three methods which can be used to control for 
their effects are recognized. First, by choosing a sample that is 
homogeneous with respect to a particular variable, the effect of 
that variable can be eliminated. In the aforementioned Theodore 
Barry and Associates study concerning Boston Edison's work force 
productivity, this approach v;as attempted by selecting as a sample 
only those firms comparable to Boston Edison. The DPU rejected this 
method, citing the disparate nature of the utilities and, therefore, 
the number of extraneous factors that would have to be controlled for 
by homogeneity. Thus this approach is just not a feasible way to 
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treat all of the extraneous factors in the electric utility sector. 
A second method commonly used is randomization, where sub¬ 
jects are assigned to various treatment groups in a random manner. 
However, due to the small sample size and the purpose of this study, 
this technique is not possible. 
Conversely the third method, controlling for the effects of 
the extraneous variables by entering them into the design as inde¬ 
pendent variables, is ideal. Not only will the effects of these 
variables on the costs per kilowatt be extracted, but, as Kerlinger 
notes, it will also yield 
. . . additional research information about the effect of 
the variables on the dependent variable and about their 
possible interaction with other independent variables 
[1969, p. 285]. 
However, before these variables can be entered into the design, one 
faces the difficult task of measuring and/or dealing with them. In 
the section to follow the extraneous factors and the methods developed 
to quantify and/or treat them are presented. In addition, the sec¬ 
tion ends with an example incorporating the variables and, as each 
variable is discussed reference is made as to its location in the 
example. 
1. Regulatory environment--If one were to choose a sample of 
^^However, due to the exploratory nature of this study, one 
factor, regulatory environment, will be controlled by choosing as a 
sample only those utilities in Massachusetts. 
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utility firms from across various jurisdictions, the data would first 
have to be standardized with respect to the different reporting re¬ 
quirements. Although this may be possible, the task would be ex¬ 
tremely time consuming. The method used to control for this factor, 
therefore, will be the first approach; a homogeneous sample--the 
large electric utility firms in Massachusetts--wi11 be selected 
rather than a more extensive sample. Since the present research is a 
feasibility study probing a nebulous and undefined area, such a 
restriction is not viewed as having a major impact on the conclusions 
of this thesis. If the findings do support the discretionary behavior 
hypothesis, a more definitive study would be necessary across all 
jurisdictions before these conclusions could be generalized. 
2. Market mix--As was discussed in Chapter III, there 
exists both a wholesale market and a retail market with the latter 
being subdivided into residential, commercial and industrial sectors. 
Logically, the more services one provides the consumer, the higher 
the cost per kilowatt. Consequently, the wholesale market supplier 
should show the lowest cost per kilowatt and, conversely, the 
residential and commercial the highest. The industrial supplier 
should fall in between, recognizing certain distributional economies 
of scale with respect to the large industrial users. The number of 
kilowatts supplied to each market is reported, and, thus, percentages 
of the total kilowatts supplied to each market segment will be used 
to identify the market mix. 
3. Vertical integration (activity mix)--The activity or 
activities engaged in by each utility will be measured by the percen- 
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tage of the total dollars invested in each--generation, transmission 
and distribution--and this is referred to as the activity mix. It 
should be noted that an individual company has several plants, each 
of which usually has a different activity mix, and by aggregating 
over all plants the activity mix of a particular utility company is 
calculated. In addition, although an individual plant generates in 
only one fashion, a utility company consisting of several plants can 
accordingly generate in several ways. This is called the generation 
mix and it is treated in detail in section 3. In this section the 
activity mix is developed according to the portion of investment 
dollars represented by each. Recognizing the specific price level 
problems discussed prior, these dollars will first be converted to 
current dollars using the Handy-Whitman Public Utility Index for 
13 
electric utilities published by the census bureau. This is treated 
in parts A and H of the example. 
Ideally each asset should be adjusted individually; however, 
due to data constraints, this cannot be done. For generation assets, 
weighted--average age is used as a surrogate and is derived in the 
following manner. For each generation type (steam, hydro, nuclear 
or gas), the kilowatt capacity for each plant is multiplied by the 
age of that plant (as of the given year) and aggregated. By then 
dividing by the total kilowatts for the generation type, the average 
^^The Handy-Whitman Index is a reproduction cost index which 
reflects the current cost to replace the exact same facility. A more 
appropriate index would be the replacement cost index which reflects 
the cost to replace the service provided by the asset rather than the 
asset itself. Unfortunately, this index is not available at the 
present time for the electric utility sector. 
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age is derived. For example, if in 1975 the total steam capacity for 
a utility is as follows: 
Plant Age Kilowatt Capacity 
Steam 1 40 500 
2 25 1000 
3 4 5000 
6500 
The average age of the steam plant would be computed by 
[500 (40) + 1000 (25) + 5000 (4)] / 6500 = 10 years 
which in essence states that the dollars invested in the steam plants 
reflect, on average, 1965 price levels. To convert to current dollars 
the total dollars invested in the steam plants is multiplied by the 
usual conversion factor using the Handy-Whitman Indices (i.e., 1975 
index/1965 index). This is treated in parts B, F and G of the 
example. 
Although this data is available for all generation facilities, 
it is not available for transmission and distribution plants. Yet 
the major specific price level problem concerns the generation plant 
investments since they are, in some cases, over fifty years old. In 
that transmission plants—high voltage lines, transformers and 
capacitors--and distribution plants--meters, poles and low voltage 
transformers--are much shorter lived, this problem may not be as 
critical as first thought. 
As a result, the percentage used to identify the activity or 
activities engaged in by each utility will be based on a total invest¬ 
ment comprised of generation plant at current dollar and transmission 
and distribution plant at nominal dollar. The measurement inconsis- 
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tancy cannot be avoided and to ignore the price level factors entirely 
would be even more problematic. 
4. Type of generation (generation mix)--To measure the 
generation mix of a utility at first seems very straight forward. 
Having converted the generation plant into current dollars, all that 
is needed now is to divide each generation type--steam, hydro, nuclear 
or other (gas)--by the total generation expressed in current dollars. 
Thus generation mix would be expressed by the percentage of total 
current generation investment in each generation type. This is 
treated in part I of the example. 
However, should generation mix have the same inpact on cost 
per kilowatt if the firm totally generates versus a firm that is in¬ 
volved in all three activities? Thus the question of activity mix 
discussed in the previous section comes into play. For example, 
assume Firm 1 totally generates and its generation types are 50% 
steam and 50% hydro, whereas Firm 2 has only 10% of its assets in¬ 
volved in the generation activity but it, too, uses 50% steam and 50% 
hydro. Clearly the impact of the generation mix should be much less 
for Firm 2 than for Firm 1. To capture this effect, the percentage 
type of generation (from the generation mix) will be multiplied by 
the percentage generation plant to total plant (from the activity 
mix) computed in the preceeding section to arrive at a weighted 
measurement on type of generation. Using the activity mix concept of 
the previous example to illustrate, and given the following data. 
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Firm 1 Firm 2 
Total Plant - current dollar 
Generation Plant - current dollar 
Steam Plant - current dollar 
Hydro Plant - current dollar 
the calculations would be as follows: 
$50,000,000 
50,000,000 
25,000,000 
25,000,000 
$50,000,000 
5,000,000 
2,500,000 
2,500,000 
Firm 1 - steam = 
hydro = 
Firm 2 - steam = 
Generation Mix % Generation % Weighted Gener- 
of Activity Mix ation Mix 
25,000,000 ^ 50,000,000 ^ 
50,000,000 
25,000,000 
50,000,000 
2,500,000 
5,000,000 
X 
X 
50,000,000 
50,000,000 y 
50,000,000 ^ 
5,000,000 
50,000,000 X 100% = 
hydro = 2,500,000 
5,000,000 
5,000,000 y 
50,000,000 ^ 
50% 
5% 
5% 
Thus to get a more meaningful measure of the impact of the generation 
mix it must be weighted by the generation activity percentage of the 
activity mix. The result is called the weighted generation mix and 
this is treated in part J of the example. 
5. Technology and Economies of Scale--While Courville noted 
the significant technological advances made in the thirty year period 
prior to 1974, it was also noted in a DPU hearing that the era of 
significant technological change with respect to electrical genera¬ 
tion had ended by the 1970's at the latest. Therefore the impact of 
technology on the period 1966-1978 might be considered to be of lim¬ 
ited importance. But since the majority of capital assets were ac¬ 
quired prior to the period under investigation, the effect of technol¬ 
ogy cannot be dismissed quite so easily. As stated earlier in the 
discussion of the dependent variable, the cost of capital can be 
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either eliminated or incorporated in the calculation of cost per 
kilowatt. If the depreciation charge is ignored, which seems to be 
a rational approach (and consequently will be taken here) since 
management has no control over it, the impact on cost per kilowatt 
should be eliminated and technology would have little impact on this 
study. If it is included technology should have a significant effect 
on the capital costs reflected in the cost per kilowatt calculation. 
In addition, this supposition itself shall be tested by entering the 
average ages of the generation types as independent variables and 
checking their relationships with the dependent variable--cost per 
kilowatt. As in the prior section on "type of generation", since all 
utilities do not have the same portion of assets invested in the 
generation activity, the average ages must first be weighted by the 
generation activity percentage of the activity mix. 
Like technology, the existence of significant economies of 
scale has been questioned for the time period under investigation. 
To test for any effect, two common measures of size will be used, 
namely kilowatt output and capacity. Since kilowatt output reflects 
all activities, there is no need to weight this factor, but since 
capacity is only with respect to generation, it will be weighed by 
the generation activity percentage of the activity mix. 
6. Variability of demand--With respect to generation, the 
load factor, defined as the ratio of average demand to peak demand, 
is the accepted measure of variability. Peak demand is reported on 
a sixty minute integrated reading and average (hourly) demand can be 
computed by taking annual output and dividing by the number of hours 
65 
14 
in a year --i.e., 365 X 24 - 8760. Thus the average demand per hour 
divided by the maximum (peak) demand per hour yields the load factor. 
Theoretically it should vary between zero and one. The closer the 
factor to zero, the higher the variability, the greater the excess 
capacity and consequently the higher the cost per kilowatt. Converse¬ 
ly, the closer the factor to one, vise-versa, since one would indicate 
constant demand or no variability. Therefore an inverse relationship 
between the load factor and the cost per kilowatt will be expected. 
This is referred to in parts C, D and K of the example. 
For those utilities that distribute, the measure of variabil¬ 
ity, called the distribution factor, used by Moody's Public Utility 
Manual is the ratio of residential sales to industrial sales. This 
information is readily available and will therefore be used in this 
study. It is thought that the higher the industrial portion, the 
more unstable or variable the demand and therefore the greater the 
excess facilities or capacity. Since the market in Massachusetts is 
divided into residential, commercial, industrial and resale, the 
Moody's distribution factor will be somewhat modified. To have its 
interpretation parallel that of the load factor, the variability here 
will be measured by the ratio of residential plus commercial to the 
total retail market--residential, commercial and industrial. Once 
again, the ratio should vary between zero and one. The closer the 
^"^Although peak demand is reported, average hourly demand is 
not. The simple assumption that all plants operate continuously will 
introduce some error into this compilation since occasional shutdowns 
are common--nuclear plants for refueling and inspection; steam plants 
for boiler maintenance and inspection; gas fueled for turbine cleaning 
and inspection. 
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ratio to zero, the higher the industrial portion, and therefore the 
more unstable the demand. Conversely, the closer the ratio to one, 
vise-versa, since one would indicate total residential and commercial 
sales. Commercial is combined with residential, not industrial, 
since it reflects the smaller businesses, characterized as profession¬ 
als, which are more stable in their demand patterns than the large 
industrial users. Resale is ignored since only the retail market is 
of concern. 
As before, since the impact of these variability indicators, 
both the load factor and the distribution factor, are relative to the 
extent each utility is involved in each activity, these factors will 
be multiplied (weighted) by their respective activity percentages 
from the activity mix. This is treated in parts E and K of the 
example. 
7. Pool Member--To understand and measure the effect of this 
variable the mechanism of the power exchange must be made clear. Firms 
that have excess capacity would price their power supplied at the 
incremental cost for the highest cost type of generation available. 
That is, when called upon to supply power, a multi type generation 
(i.e., steam, nuclear, hydro and/or gas) firm would first cost their 
output at the generation level without the pool demand and then at the 
higher generation level recognizing the pool demand—assuming the most 
expensive generation type was used to meet this incremental pool de¬ 
mand. This would be the price of the power supplied to the exchange. 
Conversely, the price paid to the exchange by the user is the cost 
that would have been incurred had that utility generated its own 
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power rather than drawing it from the exchange. The difference be¬ 
tween the cost of the power to the exchange (i.e., the estimated 
incremental cost of the supplier) and the price paid to the exchange 
(i.e., the estimated incremental cost to generate by the user) would 
be the profit on the exchange, and this would then be split between 
the two participants to the transaction. The exchange itself acts 
solely as an agent and receives no commission. This complicated 
procedure is simplified by the centralized data bank of the exchange 
(NEPOOL) and, where many suppliers stand ready to meet pool demand, 
that utility which would provide power at the least cost is automa¬ 
tically selected. In addition, the firm drawing from the pool need 
not be at full capacity; if it can draw power at a cheaper cost than 
it can generate it, the exchange v/ould automatically be made! 
To measure this factor, pool membership, a number of methods 
can be used. First, since membership can be dichotomized into sup¬ 
pliers or users, simple dummy variables identifying this characteris¬ 
tic can be employed. Next, if the extent of pool membership is of 
importance, then the kilowatts either supplied to or drawn from the 
pool could be used--with "supplied" entered as a positive and "drawn" 
as a negative. However, since pool membership is a symbiotic rela¬ 
tionship where both participants benefit from the exchange, the 
absolute value of the pool participation, kilowatts supplied or drawn, 
would seem most appropriate. This would capture or measure the ef¬ 
fect of the pool membership factor as well as recognize the mutual 
benefit. If these measures are correct there should be a negative 
relationship with the load factor. 
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8. Specific Price Level Impact On Fuel Inputs--If all fuel 
prices rose at the same rate, there would be no need to recognize 
this factor since any comparative analysis being performed would not 
be affected. In that this is not the case, the indices for coal, oil, 
nuclear and gas fuel must be tested for their effect on the cost per 
kilowatt. These indices are not as straightforward as they would 
seem and a brief description of how they were developed or dealt with 
follows. 
First, steam generation can either use coal or oil depending 
upon the particular plant. To complicate this problem, some steam 
facilities are flexible enough such that either coal or oil can be 
used. Fortunately the coal and oil indices are quite close and an 
average oil/coal index should suffice for steam generation. 
Gas turbine generation presents no problem and a simple gas 
index will be used. Nuclear fuel, however, is unique. Whereas coal, 
oil and gas are burned and replaced in a continuous cycle, nuclear 
fuel has a much longer life. Fuel rods are purchased and used over 
a longer time span, usually somewhere in the vicinity of a year to 
fifteen months, and therefore a nuclear fuel index is not available. 
For the three utilities using nuclear generation a crude index was 
devised by simply averaging the nuclear fuel costs for each year 
(when reported) and dividing by the designated base year, 1966, the 
same year used for the other indices. 
Once again, to recognize that not all firms wholly generate, 
the relative impact of these fuel indices is computed by multiplying 
the specific index by the weighted generation mix explained in section 3 
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For example, if in 1977, Firm 1 had a 30% generation activity, of which 
20% was by steam and the other 80% by nuclear generation, the relative 
fuel impact variables would be computed as follows: 
Fuel Index^ ^ % Generation % Generation 
Type 
Steam (4.98 + 4.09)/2 X .30 X .20 = .272 
Nuclear 1.47 X .30 X .80 = .353 
Gas 2.35 X .30 X 0.00 = 0.000 
This is treated in part L of the example. 
9. To illustrate--In an attempt to make this complicated and 
involved area clear, a short hypothetical example will be worked 
through. Assume in 1977 Utility 1 has the following data: 
Part Generation Transmission Distribution 
A Activity Mix--Nominal Dollars $50,000,000 $4,000,000 $12,000,000 
(Vertical Integration) 
B Generation Mix--Nominal Dollars 
Plant Age Killowatts(OOO) 
Steam 1 $8,000,000 5 30,000 
2 5,000,000 10 30,000 
Hydro 1 3,000,000 10 12,000 
2 2,000,000 15 12,000 
3 2,000,000 20 6,000 
Nuclear 20,000,000 3 100,000 
Other (Gas) 10,000,000 6 35,000 
50,000,000 225,000 
C Peak Demand Per Hour--l75,800 Kilowatts 
D Annual Output--!,200,000,000 Kilowatts 
E Market Residential 40% 
Since steam generation requires either coal or oil and the 
specific fuel is not always reported, a composite fossil fuel index, 
computed by averaging the coal and oil indices, will be used. Surpri¬ 
singly, it should be noted that these indices are quite close (see 
Appendix B). 
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Commercial 20% 
Industrial 30% 
Resale 10% 
To convert to current dollars, average age is first needed 
steam - [30,000(5) + 30,000(10)]/60,000 = 7. 
Hydro - [12,000(10) + 12,000(15) + 6,000(2)]/30,000 = 14 
Nuclear - = 3 
Gas - = 6 
Than, using the Handy-Whitman Index - 
Steam $13,000,000 (227/110) = $26,827,272 
Hydro 7,000,000 (227/89) = 17,853,932 
Nuclear 20,000,000 (227/171) = 26,549,707 
Gas 10,000,000 (227/127) = 17,874,015 
Total Generation $89,104,926 
Activity Mix --Total Investment = 
$89,104, 926 + 4,000,000 + 12,000,000 = $105,104,926 
Generation - $89,104,926/$105,104,926 = .848 
Transmission - 4,000,000/105,104,926 = .038 
Di stribution - 12,000,000/105,104,926 == .114 
Generation Mix (Unweighted by Activity Mix) 
Steam - $26,827,272/$89,104,926 = .301 
Hydro - 17,853,932/89,104,926 = .200 
Nuclear - 26,549,707/89,104,926 = .298 
Gas - 17,874,015/89,104,926 = .201 
J Generation Mix (Weighted by Activity Mix) 
Steam - .301 X .848 = .255 
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Hydro - .200 X .848 = .170 
Nuclear - .298 X .848 = .253 
Gas .201 X .848 = .170 
K Variability of Demand - 
For Generation - 
Average Hourly Demand = Annual Output/Number of Hours Per Yr. 
= 1,200,000,000/8760 = 136,986 kilowatts 
Load Factor = Average Hourly Demand/Peak Demand 
= 136,986/175,800 = .779 
For Distribution - (.40 + .20)/.90 = .667 
And thus the weighted factors for variabil ity are 
.779 (.848) • 661 
.667 (.114) • 076 
Fuel Index - Weighted 
Steam - (4.98 + 4.09)/2 X .255 = 1.156 
Nuclear - 1.47 X .253 = .372 
Gas 2.35 X .170 = .400 
Of interest are the effects of the activity mix, the weighted genera¬ 
tion mix, the weighted variability factors and the weighted fuel fac¬ 
tors on the dependent variable, cost per kilowatt. 
Choice of Variables for Inclusion in Pooled 
Regression Model 
Prior sections have discussed the dependent and independent 
variables--both exogenous and extraneous--and measurements thereon 
using an approach based on logic and reason. In that the thought 
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process is not infallible, the next step is to substantiate these 
hypothesized causal relationships using a statistical procedure called 
correlation analysis. In addition, where multiple measurement methods 
have been suggested for variables, this procedure will aid in the 
selection of the most appropriate method. It is emphasized that 
correlation analysis is nothing more than a mechanical procedure used 
to establish the existence of a linear relationship between variables; 
no statement is made with respect to one variable "causing" the other. 
Causality must be established prior, based upon some logic or theory. 
Initially, correlation analysis appears straight forward. 
Since the correlation coefficient measures how close the relationship 
between two variables is to a linear relationship, it seems that all 
one must do is choose those variables that have the correct sign and 
the highest correlation with the dependent variable, cost per kilo- 
watt--with the correct sign being designated a necessary condition. 
Where two or more measures have been suggested, a rational decision 
rule would be to choose that measurement which has the highest 
correlation with the cost per kilowatt, assuming the correct sign. 
This in fact would be the correct procedure if the independent varia¬ 
bles were not correlated with one another. Regretfully, it is almost 
certain that this is not the case, and the correlation analysis be¬ 
comes much less mechanical and more intuitive. 
Where independent variables are correlated, of importance is 
the partial correlation coefficients, which, as before, measure the 
strength of the linear relationship between an independent variable 
and the dependent variable, but now with the effect of some other 
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independent variable(s) held constant (i.e., removed). Hays and 
Winkler (1971, p. 661) illustrate this technique using a simple re¬ 
search situation involving the relationship between ability to read 
and body weight. Although there is evidence of a strong linear 
relationship between these two factors, they note that this tendency 
may be due to a third factor, chronological age. Where the effect of 
this factor is held constant in some manner, the correlation between 
reading ability and weight may vanish. Thus this observed correlation 
may be a spurious one due solely to the fact that both reading abili¬ 
ty and weight are correlated to age. It must be noted once more that 
correlation analysis is but a mechanical procedure; which variable(s) 
to control for is (are) not identified by the partial correlation model. 
Therefore, fully expecting these problems, the procedural 
steps will be as follows. First a correlation matrix will be gener¬ 
ated for all the dependent and independent variable measures dis¬ 
cussed in the prior "Variable Measurement" section. Of particular 
interest will be the correlations among the independent variables that 
exhibit a significant correlation with the dependent variable. Where 
significant correlations between independent variables are encountered, 
usually termed multicol1inearity, partial correlations will be 
generated with the controlled variables being identified in some 
logical manner based upon the data present. For example, the exogen¬ 
ous variable, size of staff, measured either by staff salaries as a 
percentage of total revenue or cost per kilowatt output, should logi¬ 
cally vary with the type of market--residential, commercial, industri¬ 
al or resale, and, hence, a high correlation is expected between these 
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variables. Therefore to find the true linear relationship between 
cost per kilowatt and size of staff, a partial correlation will pro¬ 
bably be needed controlling for type of market. Should additional 
problems develop, they will be treated as encountered in a similar 
manner. Where variables are significantly correlated, which one(s) 
to control for--that is, the true causal factor(s)--can only be 
identified by a reasoning process given the constraints on data 
availability. If spurious relationships are found, these variables 
will not be entered into the pooled regression model regardless of 
their high correlation with the dependent variable. 
Also of interest will be the relationship involving the two 
measurements of cost per kilowatt. Ideally the one that will be used 
is the computation that ignores the depreciation charge since, as 
stated, current management has no control over past investment de¬ 
cisions. In addition, this would avoid the problem involving tech¬ 
nology discussed in Chapter III. Although the argument for elimina¬ 
tion of depreciation is logical, this cost per kilowatt definition 
will only be used if the correlations, both simple and partial, of 
this measure of cost are as meaningful (again both in sign and 
strength) as the alternate measure of cost per kilowatt which in¬ 
cluded the depreciation charge. 
The results of this correlation analysis will be twofold. 
First, where multiple measures for both dependent and independent 
variables were identified as possible, choices will be made based 
upon sign and strength of correlations. And secondly, a set of in¬ 
dependent variables will be identified for inclusion in the pooled 
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regression model. Where multicol1inearity is present, partial corre¬ 
lation analysis will be used to identify and exclude all spurious 
relationships. 
The Pooled Regression Model 
The output of the correlation analysis--both simple and 
partial--wil1 be a dependent variable, cost per kilowatt--using either 
measure discussed prior, and a set of independent variables that (1) 
exhibit a significant relationship with the dependent variable in the 
hypothesized manner, and (2) are minimally correlated among themselves 
(i.e., little multi collinearity). A regression model will now be 
employed to test the explanatory power of the extraneous and exogenous 
variables included in the set of independent variables. Of particular 
interest will be the explanatory power of the exogenous variables— 
those controllable by management, for these are hypothesized to be 
indicators of efficiency in the short run. 
Although seemingly the ideal computational tool, the regres¬ 
sion model must be carefully applied. Should care not be exercised, 
a serious problem involving degrees of freedom would result due to 
lack of observations. For example, if a time series model is used, 
the validity of the results would increase by increasing the number 
of observations (i.e., years). But in a recent rate hike hearing 
(1976), results of a study based upon observations spanning 1961-1968 
were discounted due to systematic changes in the utility environment 
since that period. To the extent that these systematic changes are 
not reflected in the identified extraneous variables, the present 
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study would be subject to the same criticism. Likewise, a cross 
sectional model would experience the same problem regarding number of 
observations. To control for the effect of the regulatory environ¬ 
ment, electric utilities in Massachusetts only were used as a data 
base. Due to the nature of the industry, there are only thirteen such 
utilities. 
But by pooling the time series observations for each cross 
section, the above problems can be circumvented with the result being 
a more reliable estimate of the relationship between the dependent 
variable, cost per kilowatt, and the above mentioned independent varia¬ 
bles. Specifically, by pooling observations on the thirteen utilities 
for thirteen years, 1966-1978 (the period for which data is (1) avail¬ 
able, and (2) acceptable concerning the risk of influence from system¬ 
atic factors), a tremendous increase in the degrees of freedom would 
result. For example, assuming eight independent variables are 
finally included in the regression, the degrees of freedom would be 
increased from four to 160 by pooling (d.f.=T-K-1). The additional 
advantage of having a more representative sample would also result. 
By pooling cross sectional observations, a wider range of variation 
is attained than by solely using time series data on individual firms, 
again increasing the reliability of the coefficient estimators. 
Regretfully, the use of the pooling model is not without its 
drawbacks. First the appropriateness of pooling must be ascertained, 
and secondly, if appropriate, the question of how to pool must also 
be answered. 
By pooling, one is either explicitly or implicitly making che 
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assumption of homogeneity of the coefficient vector. Using matrix 
notation: 
■''l' 
C
\J 
X
 
• • 
• • 
• • 
Y X 
L n L nj 
3+ 
(NT X 1) (NT X K+1) (K+1 x 1) 
n. 
(NT X 1) 
N = number of firms, 13 
in this study 
T = number of time 
periods, 13 in this 
study 
K = number of indepen¬ 
dent variables 
where: 
Y^. is a vector of dependent variables; cost per kilowatt for 
13 years for firm i, i = 1 to 13, 
X^. is a matrix of independent variables; extraneous variables 
plus expense preference variables for 13 years for firm i, 
i = 1 to 13, 
is a vector of error terms for 13 years for firm i, i = 1 
to 13, 
3 is a vector of coefficients assumed common for all firms. 
To property apply the pooling model, the assumption that 3-j = 32 = 
. . . 3^ = 3 must be tested. In the event that the hypothesis is re¬ 
jected, even though the above model would lack meaning in a strict 
sense, if one is willing to trade bias for reliability (i.e., reduc¬ 
tion of variance), the model may still be applied. 
Pooling when the hypothesis is rejected will result in aggre¬ 
gation bias. To illustrate we have: 
Yi = X.B,. . e,. 
and by summing 
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Y = ZY. = Z(X.3^. + e.) 
It follows using ordinary least squares that: 
E(fc) = {X‘X)''x'Y = I{X'X)‘'X'X.B- 
and unless 3^- = 3 for all i, the expectation of an element of 3 3. 
In summary, if the hypothesis as to the stability of the Beta 
vector between cross sections is not rejected, pooling is appropriate 
and the model is properly specified. In addition, if the hypothesis 
is rejected, but the differences still considered small, an argument 
for pooling can still be made based on a tradeoff of additional bias 
for variance reduction. But if the hypothesis is conclusively re¬ 
jected, pooling is not appropriate. 
Given that pooling is deemed appropriate, regardless of 
whether the stability hypothesis on the tradeoff is accepted, the 
next question is: How to pool? The major point is whether the 
coefficient vectors are fixed parameters, random variables, or some 
combination of the two. 
If it is assumed that the vectors are fixed, as would be the 
case if the stability assumption is supported, then the covariance 
method of pooling would be used. For example, if the Beta vectors 
are not stable but the variation is assumed due to systematic factors, 
dummy variables could be employed. Time period and cross sectional 
intercepts as well as slope parameters could be varied in this manner. 
It should be noted that although the systematic effect is treated, the 
reason for it is not explained. 
However, due to the careful, and hopefully exhaustive, pro¬ 
cedure of identification of extraneous variables and expense prefer- 
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ance items, all systematic factors should be already purged from the 
data. 
Although the covariance method does not seem to apply to this 
study, the two other pooling models do seem appropriate. The vari¬ 
ance components method assumes the slope coefficients to be fixed, 
but the intercepts random. This model would be applicable where the 
overall stability of the Beta vector is rejected, but the hypothesis 
excluding the intercept term is not. By omitting the intercept the 
error term is now assumed to be comprised of three components--a time 
period, a cross section, and an interaction term. An estimating pro¬ 
cedure based on Aitken's [1934] generalized least squares is then 
applied. 
The third method, random coefficient regression, is a gener¬ 
alization of the variance components method where the slope coeffi¬ 
cients are now also considered random variables. Any variation from 
one cross section to another is not assumed to be due to systematic 
factors but rather to be totally random. Specifically 
Y. = X.(3 + 6.) + e. 
1 V 1 
where 6^. is a vector of random fluctuations. 
The choice of this method for pooling has two distinct advan¬ 
tages. First, since it is assumed that all systematic variance has 
been purged, the variance should now be due solely to random factors. 
Thus if one accepts this premise, pooling under the random coefficient 
procedure would be appropriate even when the homogeneity of the Beta 
vector is rejected. 
In addition, the use of the model eliminates the worry of 
aggregation bias. Given: 
= x.{-e^6.) .e., 
by summing ZY^. = ZX^.3 + ZX^.6^. + Zt:^., 
yields Y = X3 + ZX^.6^. + Ze^-. 
Using ordinary least squares estimator as before, 
E(6) = (X'X)‘^X'Y 
= (X'X)‘^X'(Xe + ZX.6. + le.) 
= e 
Again using matrix notation, the model is specified 
follows: 
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or 
where 
D = 
Y = X3 + D6 + e, 
X2 0 
0 • 
The error term now has two components: 
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(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
D6 due to random fluctuations of the Beta vector, 
e due to random fluctuations resulting from choice of 
cross section and/or time period. 
The assumptions of the model are: 
a.^I for i = j 
E(eJ = 0, E(e.e.) = { 
^ 0 for i / j 
E(3i) = 3 
E (e, - -6){3j - 6) = { " i = j 
3^- and are independent 
3^- and 3j are independent for i f j 
where 3^-3 
It follows that: 
U = 
X^AX^' + I 
X2AX'2+<^2 ^ 
0 
0 
V^'n " °n I 
and using Aitken's generalized least square estimator: 
3 = (X'U'^X)"^X'U'^Y 
After having established the proper pooling method, one final 
problem must be addressed: efficiency of the estimate. The objective 
of this study is to purge those factors that are uncontrollable by 
management from the cost per kilowatt and to focus on the portion of 
the variance explained by the controllable items--expense preference 
items. To be efficient, the variance of the Beta vector must be mini- 
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mi zed which is accomplished by using all data that are available. 
The first assumption of the random coefficient model is: 
E(e^.ej) = a^.^I for i = j 
0 for i f j 
When i = j, this assumption states that (1) the variance of the error 
term within a cross section is constant (i.e., homogeneity), and (2) 
the error terms over time are not correlated (i.e., absence of auto¬ 
correlation). Although the former assumption is reasonable, the 
latter is not. Autocorrelation of the error term is common and, by 
specifically treating this, the efficiency of the estimate can be 
increased. Using a first order process: 
e. . = pe. + V. 
i,t ^''i,t-l ■ ''i,t 
the variance of the error terms within each cross section can be 
16 
purged of the autocorrelation. 
Thus, by using autocorrelation coefficients which are readily 
measured, a more efficient estimate of the Beta vector is obtained. 
The covariance matrix of the error term can now be rewritten as: 
U = 
XiAXi‘ + 
0 
0 
2 + ^22^22 
0 
0 
0 0 • ■ * ^n^^ n ^ "^nn^nn 
16 An additional assumption, |e| <1, is needed to insure con¬ 
vergence. 
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where 
1 
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Pi 
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1 4-> a
 • • • 
Pi 1 
1 
Pi 
t-2 . . . p ^ 
2 
Pi Pi 1 
n t-3 . . . p 
V. .= • • • • 
11 
• • • • 
• • • • 
t-1 t-2 t-3 
... 1 [Pi Pi Pi 
Aitken's generalized least squares estimator is once again used: 
6 = (X'U'^X)’^X’U‘^Y 
with the covariance matrix now corrected for autocorrelation. ^ 
A brief summary of the computation steps is as follows: 
1. Ordinary least squares is run on each cross section using Y.j=X.j3.j+e.j 
/s 
2. Estimates of the error terms are derived: = Y.j-X.j3.j and the 
autocorrelation coefficients, p^., are computed. 
3. Generalized least squares is run on each cross section using 
Y^. = X.j3.j + U.|. That is, autocorrelation of the error terms is 
now specifically treated. 
4. Using the error term from step 3, estimators for A and a.j.j are 
computed. 
5. Form V^- matrices using results from step 2. 
6. Estimate 3 using 3 = (X'U~^)~^X'U ^Y. 
^^As before, only first order autocorrelation has been purged. 
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Interpretation of the Pooled Regression Results 
Having derived the Beta vector, the next step is to interpret 
the results with respect to the variance explained by the exogenous 
variables. The relative contribution of these factors is the primary 
concern of this thesis and now must be investigated. Since many of 
the independent variables were measured using different scales (i.e., 
kilowatts, current dollars, costs per kilowatt, percentages), the 
regression coefficients cannot be compared directly. However, to 
overcome the impasse, the variables may be standardi2ed--converted 
into units of standard deviations. 
Given a regression function on raw scores 
Y - a + B-jX-j + 32^2* 
it can be standardized in the following manner-- 
Y a a, X 
— = — + e, — —L!- + B 
°y ’ '’y 
2 ay 02 
1 
The equality should be evident. The transformed Betas (3-| — » 
^2 — ) are called Beta coefficients, standardized Betas, or Beta 
""y 18 
weights, and can be interpreted in the following manner --a one 
standard deviation change in would be reflected by a 3^* standard 
deviation change in the dependent variable, Y. Thus, since the in¬ 
dependent variables are all expressed in comparable units--units of 
standard deviations, they can now be compared in the following manner. 
The larger the absolute value of the standardized Beta, the more that 
18 The transformed betas will be denoted by an asterisk{*). 
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independent variable explains the variance in the dependent variable. 
However, when discussing these Beta coefficients, Cooley and 
Lohnes note that 
... we have to temper our interpretations with the realiza¬ 
tion that the obtained prediction results from a system of 
predictors in which the elements interact in complex fashion. 
(1971, p. 53). 
They illustrate this by considering the variance of the regressed 
Standard scores where 
1 
n 
1 
n 
n 
E 
i = l 
n 
E 
i=l 
1 
n 
n 
E 
i=l 
Y 
2 
1 
= regressed standard score, 
Y^ = observed standard score. 
2 
R = squared multiple correlation 
coefficient--the ratio of the 
explained variance to the total 
variance. 
1 n 2 
Since ^ E Y-j = 1; the variance 
of a standardized variable being 1. 
1 
n 
n 2 
i=l ' for a two parameter system. 
1 
n 
n n n 
* ★ ★2 
= + 32 + 2^1^2‘"12 
1 
n 
n 
E 
i=l 
n 
1i 
.^= - E Xo,- = I and 
^ i=l 
^12= n.f/li'2i 
If mul ticol I ineari ty is absent--i.e., importance of the 
independent variables is indicated by the square of the Beta coeffi 
cients-- 
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and a perfect measure of the relative contributions of the independent 
variables is attained. However as multicol1inearity increases, the 
★ -k 
joint contribution--23^32r-|2, confounds this technique and interpre¬ 
tation must proceed accordingly. Since multicol1inearity will be 
specifically treated and hopefully minimized via the partial correla¬ 
tion analysis discussed prior, the effect of this confounding factors 
should be minimal with the Beta coefficients then yielding a good 
measure of the relative importance of the individual independent 
variables. 
Stability 
Stability of the Beta vector over cross sections has been 
specifically treated and, in fact, was a major question regarding 
choice of the proper pooling model. However, stability of the vec¬ 
tor over time periods when cross sections are not stable has not been 
dealt with yet although it has been mentioned as a research problem. 
When pooling observation from the time period, 1966-1978, the 
implicit assumption is being made that the effects of the independent 
variables on the cost per kilowatt have remained constant. As dis¬ 
cussed prior, this assumption has been shown to be questionable in 
other studies and cannot be accepted at face; it must be tested. 
The efficient market research in the finance and accounting 
disciplines is an excellent example where this implicit assumption 
has been specifically tested. Time series regressions were used to 
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establish an individual firm's return relative to some market measure 
with the implicit assumption being that the relative measure remained 
constant, or stable, over the time period in question. If changes in 
the market environment within the time series could be postulated, it 
followed that the research conclusion could be questioned due to 
specification error. 
Initially attempts were made to test this assumption by 
dichotomizing the time periods in question into two shorter spans and 
comparing the relative measures. If they were not significantly dif¬ 
ferent, the stability assumption could not be rejected. For example, 
both Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970) and Blume (1971) found that 
the correlation between the two sets of Beta coefficients was approx¬ 
imately .60, and thus concluded that this "high" degree of association 
supported the stability assumption. However, Meyers (1973), using a 
like sample, showed that a high correlation coefficient does not 
necessarily indicate stability. Although the correlation coefficient 
for his sample was .54, in analyzing each individual Beta coefficient, 
he found that twenty five percent of these more than doubled and fifty 
percent changed by at least ten percent. Levy (1975) replicated 
these findings and in addition, found the stability problem to be 
worse for shorted time periods. Both Meyers and Levy concluded that 
this instability was enough to question any research conclusions drawn. 
Thus a simple correlation coefficient for the Beta vectors generated 
from the dichotomized time series is not sufficient; yet to merely 
itemize the percentage changes is not statistically valid. To circum¬ 
vent this impasse, the Chow and Box tests from the statistics litera- 
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ture win be applied. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
The primary objective of this study is to develop a short run 
efficiency measurement model for the electric utility industry. Due 
to the nature of the industry, a very precise methodology was re¬ 
quired based upon suppositions concerning both exogenous and extrane¬ 
ous variables. Consequently, for this model to be consistent and 
cohesive, a number of hypotheses must be tested--designated primary 
and secondary. 
Primary hypothesis. 
The impact of the expense preference items on the cost per 
kilowatt can be used as a short-run measure of efficiency in 
the electric utility industry, given that extraneous factors 
are properly controlled. 
Hypotheses to be tested with respect to the individual expense 
preference items are as follows: 
H-j: There is a positive relationship between relative staff 
cost and cost per kilowatt. 
82* There is a positive relationship between relative man¬ 
agement salaries and cost per kilowatt. 
There is a positive relationship between unwarranted 
growth and cost per kilowatt. 
There is a negative relationship between return on sales 
and cost per kilowatt. 
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Secondary hypotheses. To validate measurement devices used a number 
of secondary hypotheses must also be tested. 
With respect to the endogenous variables: 
H^1: There is a negative relationship between return on sales 
and size of staff, management salaries and unwarranted growth. 
With respect to extraneous variables: 
There is a positive relationship between market integra¬ 
tion and cost per kilowatt. 
^s3* There is a positive relationship between vertical in¬ 
tegration and cost per kilowatt. 
*^s4* There is either a positive relationship or no relation¬ 
ship at all between age of facilities and cost per kilowatt. 
^s5* There is either a negative relationship or no relation¬ 
ship at all between economies of scale and cost per kilowatt. 
^s6‘ There is a negative relationship between the load fac¬ 
tor and cost per kilowatt. 
There is a negative relationship between the market 
variability factor and cost per kilowatt. 
^s8‘ There is a negative relationship between pool trans¬ 
actions and cost per kilowatt. 
H^g: There is a positive relationship between the fuel in¬ 
dices and cost per kilowatt. 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Data Problems 
Data were gathered on the thirteen electric utilities report¬ 
ing to the Massachusetts DPU (for a list of their names see Appendix 
A) for the time period 1966-1978. However, one utility. Canal Elec¬ 
tric Company, was just organized in 1966 and at least the first three 
years data reflect construction in progress rather than normal acti¬ 
vity. Thus a choice was necessary: either to use only twelve utili¬ 
ties for the thirteen years or to use the thirteen utilities for only 
ten years (1969-1978). Since it was not clear at what year "normal" 
activities commenced, the former option was taken. 
Results of the Correlation Analysis 
19 
The simple correlation analysis. 
Cost per kilowatt. Pertaining to the endogenous and extrane¬ 
ous variables, there is little difference between the two measurements 
of cost per kilowatt (see Appendix D). All correlations are of the 
same sign and are of the approximate same significance. Except with 
respect to the average age variables, which were conceptualized as 
^^All discussion in this section refers to the correlation 
matrix in Appendix D. 
^^Unless otherwise specified, all tests of significance will 
refer to the .05 level. In addition, one may argue that the use of 
inferential statistics is not appropriate in that the utilities used 
in this study comprise a population and not a sample on which popula- 
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measures of technological advancement, this is not surprising. The 
first measure of cost per kilowatt includes a charge for depreciation 
and thus the negative correlations between this cost per kilowatt and 
the age variables probably reflects the significantly lower deprecia¬ 
tion charges for the older capital assets. Yet with the second cost 
per kilowatt calculation, which omits the depreciation charge, the 
signs are the same and the significance levels virtually identical. 
This result is puzzling because, if the age variables properly re¬ 
flected technological advances, a positive relationship should exist 
--the older the facility, the more obsolete and, therefore, the higher 
the cost per kilowatt. As a result, the second measurement of cost 
per kilowatt, that ignoring depreciation (since it is uncontrollable), 
21 
will be used in the analysis to follow. 
Endogenous variables. The correlation of both measures of 
size of staff and management salary (i.e., as a percentage of sales 
and per kilowatt output) to cost per kilowatt are as hypothesized: 
significant positive relationships. However, the high degree of 
multicol1inearity among these variables suggests that only one 
variable be entered into the regression model. Since the staff ex¬ 
pense per kilowatt output variable is the most signfiicant, and given 
the aforementioned problems^^ with the reliability of the management 
tion parameters may be inferred. However, the observations do repre¬ 
sent a sample over time, and, thus, the use of inferential statistics 
is supported. 
^ht may be assumed that any subsequent reference made to cost 
per kilowatt is based upon the measurement omitting the depreciation 
charge. 
^^See the Exogenous Variable section in Chapter IV. 
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salary data, the former seems the likely candidate. 
The unwarranted growth factor displays no significant relation¬ 
ship to the cost per kilowatt and consequently the hypothesis with 
respect to this variable is rejected. As a result, unwarranted growth 
is excluded from any further analysis. 
Of the two measures of professional excellence, the first, 
variance from the thirteen percent rate of return allowed on equity, 
manifests exactly the opposite behavior as hypothesized*Iwhile the 
second, return on sales, exhibits the hypothesized significant nega¬ 
tive relationship to cost per kilowatt. However, both measures are 
positively correlated to both measures of size of staff and manage¬ 
ment salary whereas significant negative relationships were hypothesized. 
Clearly, the first measurement device for professional excellence 
does not meet the task and the second, although having the correct 
relationship to cost per kilowatt, is suspect due to its positive 
relationship to the other expense preference items. Yet this problem 
may be due to an intervening variable(s) and will be discussed 
further in the partial correlation section. 
Extraneous variables. As was hypothesized regarding market 
mix, residential and commercial percentages have almost identical 
significant positive correlations to cost per kilowatt while resale 
has a significant negative relationship. Likewise, as was hypothe¬ 
sized, concerning activity mix, generation percentage exhibits a sig¬ 
nificant inverse relationship to cost per kilowatt and distribution 
^^This choice will be further supported in the Partial Corre¬ 
lation section to follow. 
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percentage a significant direct relationship. Transmission percen¬ 
tage, being negatively correlated to cost per kilowatt, probably re¬ 
flects that it is more likely found in conjunction with the generation 
rather than the distribut''on activity. Finally, as was postulated in 
Chapter III, the activity and market mixes are highly correlated-- 
generation percentage highly correlated with the resale percentage 
and distribution percentage with the residential and commercial per¬ 
centages. The partial correlation analysis section to follow will 
suggest a solution to this problem. 
The types of generation all display significant correlations 
to cost per kilowatt but with steam, hydro and nuclear being negative 
and gas positive. The negative relationships may reflect the domin¬ 
ance of the generation activity--that is, any type of generation would 
have an inverse relationship to cost per kilowatt when compared to 
non-generating utilities. Likewise, the gas generation correlation 
probably reflects the small utility (note the -.5160 correlation 
between gas generation and economies of scale-output). Additional 
results will be discussed in the partial correlation section. 
As was discussed in the cost per kilowatt section above, age 
was not proven to be a good surrogate for technology as evidenced by 
the negative correlations between age of the generation facilities 
and cost per kilowatt. However, both measures of economies of scale, 
log of output and log of weighted capacity, did reveal the expected 
negative correlations to cost per kilowatt. Which measure to choose 
^^The only utility that solely relies on gas generation is the 
tiny Nantucket Electric Company. 
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will be discussed further in the partial correlation section. 
Concerning the variability factors, the load factor has, as 
hypothesized, a significant negative correlation to cost per kilowatt. 
However, this may reflect the fact that load factors are only rele¬ 
vant for generating utilities which have lower costs per kilowatt 
(note the .7339 correlation between the load factor and the generation 
percentage). Likewise, the distributional factor, although it ex¬ 
hibits a relationship to cost per kilowatt exactly opposite to that 
hypothesized, may be simply reflecting the distribution activity 
rather than the hypothesized variability factor. Again, the following 
partial correlation analysis will help to solve the problem. 
In contradiction to the hypothesis, pool transactions had 
absolutely no relationship to cost per kilowatt. As curious as this 
first seems, this may make sense in that only those firms that could 
benefit took advantage of the pool membership. Those firms that al¬ 
ready were the least expensive would have no use for the pool. Thus, 
if anything, the pool may tend to decrease the variability in the cost 
per kilowatt. 
Probably the most puzzling results were those of the fuel in¬ 
dice correlations. There is no relationship between the fossil fuel 
index and cost per kilowatt and a significant negative relationship 
between the nuclear fuel index and the cost per kilowatt. Only the 
gas fuel index was as hypothesized--a significant positive relation¬ 
ship. At first, it was thought that this was due to the influence of 
the negative relationship of generation to cost per kilowatt--that is, 
since the fuel indices were weighted by the generation percentage, the 
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negative correlation of the generation activity may be confounding the 
correlations. Yet when the unweighted (or raw) fuel indices were 
used the correlations were almost exactly the same (-.0016, -.2600, 
.4238). This problem will also be discussed in the succeeding partial 
correlation section. 
The partial correlations analysis. 
Extraneous variables. Since the interrelationship of the 
market mix and the activity mix is the most important, the unraveling 
of the multicol1inearity problems inherent in this study will begin 
here. In addition, the results of this analysis will be used in 
further partial correlation analyses. 
Essentially, the question is which is (are) the true causal 
factor(s) and which is (are) the spurious factor(s)? Or, rephrased 
with respect to the interplay of the activity and market mixes, does 
the market mix dictate the activity mix or, vis versa? 
By first controlling for the activity mix (generation and/or 
distribution) it is apparent that the market mix is still highly 
significant--barring the industrial percentage which never was sig¬ 
nificant (see Table 1). Conversely, when the market mix is controlled, 
the activity mix becomes insignificant. Thus it seems that the mar¬ 
ket mix is dominant but this is not equivalent to causality. As was 
discussed in Chapter IV, causality implies a base in logic. In this 
situation, it makes sense that the activity mix does follow from the 
market a utility is engaged in. 
The next question is which of the market mix variables, since 
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TABLE 1 
PARTIAL CORRELATION OF COST PER KILOWATT 
To Controlling For 
Residential % 
Commercial % 
Industrial % 
Resale % 
.3908 (.001) 
.4086 (.001) 
.0467 (.282) 
-.4469 (.001) 
Generation % 
Residential % 
Commercial % 
Industrial % 
Resale % 
.3809 (.001) 
.4036 (.001) 
.0310 (.351 ) 
-.4385 (.001) 
Distribution % 
Residential % 
Commercial % 
Industrial % 
Resale % 
.3898 (.001) 
.4045 (.001) 
.0291 (.360) 
-.4396 (.001) 
Generation % and 
Distribution % 
Generation % 
Distribution % 
-.0082 (.460) 
.0329 (.342) 
Residential % 
Generation % 
Distribution % 
-.0309 (.352) 
-.0409 (.307) 
Resale % 
Generation % 
Distribution % 
.0161 (.422) 
.0047 (.477) 
Residential % and 
Industrial % 
Generation % 
Distribution % 
.0711 (.191) 
-.0477 (.278) 
Resale % and 
Industrial % 
Number within the parentheses denotes the level of significance. 
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they are highly intercorrelated, should be entered into the regression 
(once again refer to Appendix D). Clearly all four cannot be entered. 
In addition, residential and commercial are significantly correlated 
and both have a significant negative correlation with the resale 
percentage. Thus either residential or resale or each paired with 
industrial should (1) circumvent the major multicol1inearity problems 
within the market mix variables and (2) capture the explanatory 
powers of the activity mix variables. Any of the four choices would 
seem appropriate as can be seen from Table 1, and the final choice, 
resale and industrial percentage, was made not only with regard to 
25 
the results of this partial correlation analysis but, in addition, 
with regard to the analyses which follow. 
Furthermore, not only is it plausible that the type of market 
dictates the activity mix, but it may also dominate the type of 
generation. That is, the significant negative relationships between 
the cost per kilowatt and steam, hydro and nuclear generation probably 
reflect the generation activity rather than the type of generation. 
In addition, since the market mix dominates the activity mix, a par¬ 
tial correlation of the type of generation to the cost per kilowatt 
controlling for market mix seems reasonable. The results of this 
analysis suggest that only gas generation has any significant relation¬ 
ship to the cost per kilowatt or, put in another way, that there is 
^^It should be noted that the pair, resale and industrial 
percentage, outperform the other three candidates in that the acti¬ 
vity mix variables are now opposite in sign to their simple correla¬ 
tions with cost per kilowatt. 
no competitive advantage among steam, hydro or nuclear generation 
(see Table 2). 
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TABLE 2 
PARTIAL CORRELATION OF COST PER KILOWATT 
To Controlling For 
Steam generation % -.0390 (.316) 
Hydro generation % .0179 (.413) Resale % and 
Nuclear generation % -.0798 (.162) Industrial % 
Gas generation % .2563 (.001) 
The same logic can be applied to the variability factors. It 
was suggested in the previous section that the negative correlation 
of the load factor may be due to the dominance of the generation ac¬ 
tivity. In fact, a partial correlation analysis of the load factor 
to cost per kilowatt, controlling for generation percentage, does 
reveal a lower negative relationship (-.1603), but one that is still 
significant at the .05 level. However, the partial correlation con¬ 
trolling for resale and industrial percentage is -.0014 (significance 
.444), probably reflecting that the explanatory power of the load 
factor with respect to cost per kilowatt is due to the relative 
stability of the resale market versus the retail market. Likewise, 
it was suggested that the significance of the market variability 
factor was due to the dominance of the distribution activity. A par¬ 
tial correlation analysis of this factor to cost per kilowatt, con¬ 
trolling for resale and industrial percentage, yields -.0576 which, 
although it is now of the hypothesized sign, is not significant. Thus 
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neither of the variability factors would contribute any explanatory 
power to the regression analysis to be performed. 
In a similar vein, the negative relationship between econo¬ 
mies of scale and cost per kilowatt can be explained by the market 
mix variables. The partial correlation is .1024 (.103 significance) 
when the resale and industrial percentages are controlled for, once 
again probably reflecting that the utilities in the wholesale market 
are the ones that enjoy any large economies of scale. 
Finally, the puzzling fossil and nuclear fuel indices may 
also be explained in a like manner. Since these are weighted by the 
generation activity, the only fuel indices in the data base would be 
those utilities engaged in the generation activity--that is, if the 
generation percentage is zero, the weighted fuel index would be zero 
since the appropriate fuel index (fossil, nuclear, or gas) would be 
multiplied by zero. When generation is controlled via controlling 
the resale and industrial percentages, the fossil fuel index is as 
hypothesized--positive and significant--and the significance of the 
gas index does not change. The nuclear index, however, is not signi¬ 
ficant (see Table 3). 
TABLE 3 
PARTIAL CORRELATION OF COST PER KILOWATT 
To Controlling For 
Fossil fuel (weighted) 
Nuclear fuel (weighted) 
Gas fuel (weighted) 
.4127 (.001) 
-.0773 (.170) 
.2787 (.001) 
Resale % and 
Industrial % 
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Endogenous variables. Although the relationship of the endogenous 
variables--staff expense at a percentage of sales, staff expense per 
kilowatt output, salary expense as a percentage of sales and salary 
expense per kilowatt output--are all of hypothesized sign and signifi¬ 
cant with respect to cost per kilowatt, it can be argued that this 
is due to the type of market (for example, a residential market 
utility requires more staff than a resale market utility due to the 
larger number of customers). When the market mix is controlled for, 
the partial correlations are interesting (see Table 4). Whereas the 
correlations of the relative measures remain positive and significant, 
the measures expressed as a percentage of sales exhibit either a 
negative relationship or no relationship at all. Thus these measures 
of expense preference variables expressed per unit of physical out¬ 
put remain unexplained by the market activity. However, due to the 
extremely high correlation between these two relative measures 
(.9195), the staff salary per kilowatt was chosen as the independent 
variable due to (1) its higher correlation to cost per kilowatt (both 
26 
simple and partial) and (2) its reliability. 
The negative relationship between return on sales (profession¬ 
al excellence) and cost per kilowatt may also be explained by control¬ 
ling for the market mix. However, as Table 5 reveals, when the 
market mix is controlled, this negative relationship becomes even more 
significant. As a result this measure of professional excellence 
will be entered into the pooled regression model as an independent 
variable but with some misgivings. Although the relationships between 
26 See footnote 22. 
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TABLE 4 
PARTIAL CORRELATION OF COST PER KILOWATT 
To Controlling For 
Staffl -.1649 (.020) 
Staff2 .3739 (.001) Residential % 
Sal aryl .0064 (.469) 
Sal ary2 .2212 (.003) 
Staffl .2273 (.002) 
Staff2 .6103 (.002) Industrial % 
Sal aryl .4227 (.001) 
Sal ary2 .5438 (.001 ) 
Staffl -.1829 (.011) 
Staff2 .3447 (.001) Resale % 
Sal aryl .1912 (.009) 
Salary2 .3474 (.001) 
Staffl -.1807 (.020) 
Staff2 .3886 (.001) Residential % and 
Salaryl .0712 (.190) Industrial % 
Salary2 .2968 (.001) 
Staffl -.2479 (.001) 
Staff2 .3181 (.001) Resale % and 
Salaryl .0295 (.405) Industrial % 
Sal ary2 .2386 (.001) 
size of staff and professional excellence to cost per kilowatt are as 
hypothesized, the relationship between these two endogenous variables 
is not. There is a significant positive relationship between them 
whereas a negative relationship is postulated by Williamson. This 
cannot be explained. 
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TABLE 5 
PARTIAL CORRELATION OF COST PER KILOWATT 
To Controlling For 
Return on sales -.3828 (.001) Residential % 
Return on sales -.2410 (.001) Industrial % 
Return on sales -.3545 (.001) Resale % 
Return on sales -.3743 (.001) Residential % and 
Industrial % 
Return on sales -.4190 (.001) Resale % and 
Industrial % 
In summary. 
Dependent variab1e--cost per kilowatt. Of the two measures 
discussed in Chapter IV, the second measure which omits the deprecia¬ 
tion charge will be used as the dependent variable in the pooled re¬ 
gression model. 
Independent variable--exogenous. With respect to the primary 
hypotheses, significant positive relationships were found between size 
of staff and cost per kilowatt (H-j ) and management salary and cost 
per kilowatt (H2)- Partial correlation analysis yielded no evidence 
to doubt these findings. However, the two factors were highly corre¬ 
lated, precluding the entrance of both into the pooled regression 
model. No relationship was found between unwarranted growth and cost 
per kilowatt (H3) and this factor has been discarded. Finally, the 
expected negative relationship between professional excellence and 
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cost per kilowatt (H^) was found and the additional partial correla¬ 
tion analysis served only to enhance this relationship. Regretfully, 
the secondary hypothesis postulating a negative relationship 
between size of staff and professional excellence was rejected there¬ 
by rendering the primary hypotheses findings somewhat inconclusive. 
Nonetheless, professional excellence as measured by return on sales 
and size of staff as measured by staff expense per kilowatt will be 
entered into the pooled regression model. 
Independent variables--extraneous. The findings of the 
simple correlation analysis supported the secondary hypotheses con¬ 
cerning the positive relationship between the market mix and cost per 
kilowatt positive relationship between the activity mix 
(vertical integration) and the cost per kilowatt negative 
relationship between economies of scale and cost per kilowatt 
and the negative relationship between the load factor and cost per 
kilowatt However, the subsequent partial correlation analysis 
revealed that these findings may all be dominated by the market mix-- 
that is, when the market mix was controlled, the partial correlations 
of these factors with cost per kilowatt become insignificant. 
Additional findings of the simple correlation analysis re¬ 
jected the secondary hypotheses concerning the positive relationship 
between age and cost per kilowatt the negative relationship 
between the market variability factor and cost per kilowatt (H^^) and 
the negative relationship between pool transactions and cost per 
kilowatt These findings were not reversed by any subsequent 
partial correlation analysis. 
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Although the positive relationships between the fuel indices 
and the cost per kilowatt (H^g) were rejected by the simple correla¬ 
tion analysis, the subsequent partial correlation analysis did yield 
a positive fossil fuel index while retaining the initial positive 
gas fuel index. The lack of a relationship between the nuclear fuel 
27 index and the cost per kilowatt was not explained. 
Consequently, selected for inclusion in the pooled regression 
model were the market mix variables, resale and industrial percentage, 
and the fossil and gas fuel indices. 
Results of the Pooled Regression Analysis 
Due to the extr&re stability present in the utility industry 
the original pooling formulation is not appropriate. As can readily 
be seen in Appendix F, pooling by utility over time leads to singu¬ 
larity problecK and the computational steps requiring either ordinary 
least squares or generalized least squares analysis on each cross 
section (utility) cannot be performed. Thus the use of a cross- 
sectional pooling methodology is not possible. However, this problem 
can be circumvented if, instead, a time series pooling methodology is 
employed. That is, if the data are now pooled by year rather than by 
utility, the singularity problems are avoided (see Appendix E). 
The results of the analysis using the time series pooling 
^^However, it was noted that nuclear fuel is not like the other 
fuels where there are frequent transactions facilitating the compila¬ 
tion of an index. Since no index could be found, one was constructed 
from the little information contained in the reports of the three 
nuclear utilities in Massachusetts. 
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approach are given in Table 6. As can be readily seen, the Swamy 
Model does not yield straight forward results. Although the beta 
values are as expected-- 
3-j = negative, indicating an inverse relationship between 
the industry percentage and cost per kilowatt, probably 
because the larger the industrial percentage, the smal¬ 
ler the residential and commercial percentages, both of 
which yield higher costs per kilowatt, 
^2 = negative, indicating, as before, the inverse relation¬ 
ship between resale percentage and cost per kilowatt, 
3^ = positive, indicating the hypothesized direct relation¬ 
ship between staff expense and cost per kilowatt, 
3^, 3^ = positive, indicating the hypothesized direct relation¬ 
ship between the weighted fossil and gas fuel indices 
and cost per kilowatt, 
3g = negative, indicating the hypothesized inverse relation¬ 
ship between the return on sales and cost per kilowatt-- 
they are far from conclusive due to the problems concerning the esti¬ 
mated variances, two of which are negative. Although negative vari¬ 
ances are theoretically not possible, they can occur when using the 
Swamy Model and may indicate specification error. 
In the Swamy Model the variance of the betas is dichotomized 
into a within group component and a between group component with the 
latter hypothesized to be due to random factors. Thus he postulates 
the existence of n beta vectors (n in this situation referring to time 
periods) with their differences due to random factors. To estimate 
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TABLE 6 
SWAMY POOLED REGRESSION RESULTS—ALL VARIABLES 
Variable: Constant Ind % Resale % staff 
B Estimate: .0292 -.0163 -.0146 .0042 
Asymptotic Variance: .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Variable: Fos Fuel Gas Fuel Pro Ex 
B Estimate: .0002 • 0163 -.0487 
Asymptotic Variance: .0000 • 0000 -.0000 
Pooled R^: .51 
Estimate of delta: 
.0003 -.0003 -.0002 -.0001 .0000 .0001 -.0003 
-.0003 .0002 .0001 .0001 -.0000 -.0001 .0004 
-.0002 .0001 .0001 .0000 -.0000 -.0000 .0002 
-.0001 .0001 .0000 .0000 -.0000 .0000 .0001 
.0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 .0000 .0000 -.0000 
.0001 -.0001 -.0000 .0000 .0000 -.0001 -.0001 
-.0003 .0004 .0002 .0001 -.0000 -.0001 -.0001 
the between group variance-covariance matrix--called the delta matrix 
--the within group variance-covariance matrix is subtracted from the 
total variance-covariance matrix. That is-- 
delta = 
n 
Z 
i = l 
b. b' • 
1 1 
n 
I b. 
i=l 
n 
Z b 
i=l 
s.^(X'iXi)-l 
1=1  
N-1 N 
where b^. and s^.^ are estimates of B^. and From Table 6 it can 
be seen that the between group variance caused by the hypothesized 
random factors (the delta matrix) is almost nonexistent. This has 
been suggested to be (1) an indication that the Swamy formulation may 
not be applicable and (2) an explanation of the negative variances. 
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In this situation a more appropriate pooling methodology may 
be the one espoused by Zellner (1966) which assumes, like Swamy, that 
the observations are from independently and identically distributed 
populations but, in addition, that there exists only one beta vector-- 
the differences due to repeated samples on the same (fixed) popula¬ 
tion vector. Here the beta vector is estimated from pooled observa¬ 
tions that are first transformed or standardized as follows: 
B = " (x:x./s.^)'^ (x;y,/s.^) 
1=1 1 1 1 111 
The results of the Zellner methodology are reported in Table 
7. Except for the beta values for the fuel indices, the vectors 
under each pooling methodology are almost identical. Furthermore, 
since the Zellner method does yield the expected positive variances, 
t tests for the beta values are also possible. As is shown, all the 
t values are significant (t = 1.66) except that for the gas 
fuel index, which is also of the wrong sign. However, the F statis¬ 
tic with respect to the assumption inherent in the pooling model that 
the beta vectors over time are equal is clearly rejected (F gg 
o oo 
= 1.51) and the pooled R is a dismal .51. 
Thus the results of the first analyses are far from hearten¬ 
ing. The Swamy methodology yields negative variances which probably 
indicate some specification error and thus generate little confidence 
in the results. Likewise the Zellner methodology yields both an F 
^^Although the Swamy methodology is questionable, its pooled 
beta vector consistantly was the equal of the2Zellner vector through¬ 
out this analysis as measured by the pooled R . 
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TABLE 7 
ZELLNER POOLED REGRESSION RESULTS—ALL VARIABLES 
Variable: Constant Ind % Resale % Staff 
B Estimate: .0228 -.0167 -.0125 .0079 
Asymptotic Variance: .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
t Value: 45.68 -.11.33 -25.00 15.80 
Variable: Fos Fuel Gas Fuel Pro Ex 
B Estimate: .0037 -.0011 -.0498 
Asymptotic Variance: .0000 .0000 .0000 
t Value: 12.33 -.73 -12.45 
F Statistic: 13.7961 
R^: .51 
2 
statistic and an R which indicate that the methodology is not appro¬ 
priate and explains little of the variance of the cost per kilowatt. 
All that can be said is that the signs of the beta coefficients are as 
hypothesized. 
However a perusal of the ordinary least squares results for 
each time period, combined with some common sense, does suggest a 
somewhat different approach (see Table 8). First, the gas fuel index 
contributes little to the regressions and should be eliminated. And 
secondly, there appears to be two distinct time periods within the 
data--pre 1973 and post 1973. This should come as no surprise given 
the oil embargo of 1973 and the subsequent skyrocketing fuel costs 
faced by the utilities. 
However, even if the gas fuel index is eliminated, the re¬ 
sults are almost exactly the same (see Tables 9 and 10). As a result 
the data are divided into the two time periods--1966-1972, 1974-1978-- 
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TABLE 8 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES RESULT BY YEAR—ALL VARIABLES 
Year Constant Ind % Resale % Staff 
1966 .0204 ( 3.89) -.0134 (• -1.82) -.0094 ( - 3.00) .0089 ( 2.44) 
1967 .0181 ( 5.15) -.0122 (■ -2.19) -.0090 ( - 4.03) .0087 ( 3.04) 
1968 .0149 ( 3.98) -.0141 (■ -2.43) -.0083 ( - 3.40) .0112 ( 3.14) 
1969 .0156 ( 6.67 -.0147 (■ -3.38) -.0077 ( - 4.18) .0113 ( 4.19) 
1970 .0154 (10.97) -.0141 (■ -3.44) -.0080 ( - 4.23) .0114 ( 4.44) 
1971 .0191 ( 7.79) -.0196 {■ -3.46) -.0138 ( - 6.50) .0052 ( 1.88) 
1972 .0179 { 7.50) -.0107 (■ -1.71) -.0081 ( - 3.39) .0105 ( 3.12) 
1973 .0237 (20.05) -.0156 ( -4.41) -.0141 ( -10.61) .0059 ( 3.86) 
1974 .0402 ( 5.22) -.0220 ( - .99) -.0240 ( - 2.70) .0030 ( .43) 
1975 .0470 ( 8.58) -.0415 ( -3.15) -.0300 ( - 5.63) .0019 ( .35) 
1976 .0525 ( 5.58) -.0525 ( -2.84) -.0309 ( - 4.41) .0008 ( .09) 
1977 .0638 ( 7.60) -.0600 ( -3.73) -.0367 ( - 5.21) ■ -.0107 (- -1.16) 
1978 .0503 ( 8.49) -.0426 ( -3.30) -.0278 ( - 6.34) .0021 ( .37) 
Year Fos Fuel Gas Fuel Pro Ex 
1966 -.0022 (-.70) .0003 ( .01) -.0503 (-1.72) 
1967 -.0011 (-.46) .0009 ( .06) -.0346 (-1.65) 
1968 .0000 ( .00) -.0149 (- .82) -.0216 (- .92) 
1969 -.0008 (-.37) -.0111 (- .95) -.0265 (-1.55) 
1970 .0005 ( .39) -.0128 (-1 .18) -.0224 (-1.56) 
1971 .0042 (2.49) .0041 ( .40) -.0009 (- .05) 
1972 .0002 ( .08) -.0178 (-1 .73) -.0179 (-1.21) 
1973 .0033 (4.46) -.0059 (-1 .54) -.0187 (-2.46) 
1974 -.0006 (-.30) -.0054 (- .50) -.0326 (- .84) 
1975 .0034 (3.00) -.0043 {- .60) -.0598 (-1.94) 
1976 .0029 (1.73) -.0009 (- .07) -.0766 (-1.69) 
1977 .0025 (1.80) .0116 (1 .05) -.0932 (-2.32) 
1978 .0015 (1.04) .0016 ( .21) -.0510 (-1.25) 
Number within the parentheses denotes the t values where 
^.05,11 
1.796. 
no 
TABLE 9 
SWAMY AND ZELLNER POOLED REGRESSION 
RESULTS—GAS FUEL INDEX OMITTED 
Swamy Results-- 
Variable: Constant Ind % Resale % Staff 
Betas: .0280 -.0149 -.0144 .0063 
Asymptotic Variance: .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Variable: Fos Fuel Pro Ex 
Betas: .0007 -.0449 
Asymptotic Variance: .0000 -.0000 
Pooled R^: .56 
Estimate of delta: 
.0002 -.0002 -.0002 -.0001 . 0000 .0003 
-.0002 .0002 .0001 . 0000 .0000 .0004 
-.0002 .0001 .0001 . 0000 .0000 .0002 
-.0001 .0000 .0000 . 0000 .0000 .0001 
.0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 . 0000 .0000 
-.0003 .0004 .0002 .0001 .0000 .0001 
Zellner Results-- 
Variable: Constant Ind % Resale % Staff 
Betas: .0232 -.0173 -.0128 .0077 
Asymptotic Variance: .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
t Value: 46.40 -11.53 -25.60 25.67 
Variable: Fos Fuel Pro Ex 
Betas: .0038 -.0524 
Asymptotic Variance: .0000 .0000 
t Value: 12.67 -12.78 
F Statistic: 17.013 
Pooled R^: .51 
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TABLE 10 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES RESULTS BY YEAR—GAS 
FUEL INDEX OMITTED 
Year Constant Ind % Resale % 
1966 .0203 ( 4.81) -.0134 (-2.00) -.0093 (- 4.11) 
1967 .0180 ( 6.43) -.0122 (-2.41) -.0089 (- 5.66) 
1968 .0168 { 6.04) -.0139 (-2.45) -.0095 (- 4.96) 
1969 .0170 ( 9.23) -.0141 (-3.31) -.0086 (- 5.49) 
1970 .0164 (14.57) -.0143 (-3.41) -.0095 (- 6.57) 
1971 .0186 ( 9.79) -.0196 (-3.75) -.0134 (- 8.13) 
1972 .0207 (10.13) -.0089 (-1.25) -.0101 (- 4.17) 
1973 .0249 (15.02) -.0160 (-4.09) -.0150 (-11.41) 
1974 .0422 ( 6.03) -.0228 (-1.11) -.0259 (- 3.43) 
1975 .0494 (14.10) -.0440 (-3.74) -.0320 (- 8.19) 
1976 .0530 ( 8.69) -.0529 (-3.25) -.0312 (- 6.51) 
1977 .0568 (16.89) -.0557 (-3.56) -.0313 (- 6.46) 
1978 .0496 (11.09) -.0435 (-3.95) -.0275 (- 7.14) 
Year Staff % Fos Fuel Pro Ex 
1966 .0090 ( 8.97) -.0022 (- .77) -.0503 (-1.88) 
1967 .0089 (11.83) -.0011 (- .50) -.0346 (-1.80) 
1968 .0083 ( 9.23) -.0005 (- .17) -.0252 (-1.12) 
1969 .0089 ( 9.81 ) -.0010 (- .48) -.0279 (-1.65) 
1970 .0085 (11.89) .0007 ( .56) -.0155 (-1.15) 
1971 .0062 ( 6.43) .0042 ( 2.67) -.0012 (- .07) 
1972 .0051 ( 3.64) -.0001 (- .03) -.0168 (- .99) 
1973 .0038 ( 4.75) .0032 ( 3.95) -.0180 (-2.13) 
1974 .0002 { .06) -.0005 (- .26) -.0340 (- .94) 
1975 -.0010 (- .47) .0034 ( 3.22) -.0630 (-2.10) 
1976 -.0014 (- .48) .0029 ( 1.89) -.0773 (-1.91) 
1977 -.0015 (- .56) .0025 ( 1.79) -.0895 (-2.22) 
1978 .0032 ( 1.58) .0016 ( 1.23) -.0499 (-1.34) 
and rerun. 
The results for the time period 1966-1972, shown in Table 11, 
are more interesting. It can be seen that the Swamy methodology is 
still questionable with five of the six estimated variances now nega- 
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tive. As before, the delta matrix is essentially a null matrix in¬ 
dicating the absence of the postulated between group random variation. 
2 
Nonetheless, the R is a remarkable .94 and the signs of the values 
are as hypothesized. On the other hand, the Zellner results are 
consistently excellent. The beta values are of the right sign and 
significant (t q2 ~ 1•66)--excepting the fossil fuel index.In 
addition, the F statistic does not result in rejection of the fixed 
beta vector hypothesis (F ^5 42 ^ 1-71) and the pooled R is even 
higher, .96. 
In like fashion, the results from the time period 1974-1978 
are equally interesting (see Table 12). The Swamy methodology is 
still questionable--four of the six estimated variances are negative 
and the delta matrix is again essentially a null matrix. Yet, as 
2 
before, the betas are all of the correct sign and the R is .85. 
Likewise, the Zellner model yields betas of the correct sign, an F 
2 
statistic that cannot be rejected (F 24 30 " 1*89), and an R of 
.86. Of more interest, however, is the significance of the betas 
(t Qg gg = 1.66). As expected, the fossil fuel index is now signifi¬ 
cant reflecting the almost threefold increase in the index. Moreover, 
as hypothesized by Cyert and March (1963), Onsi (1963) and others, 
the staff variable is no longer significant. This slack or, as 
Williamson terms it, expense preference item has now been converted 
^^The insignificant t value for the fossil fuel index is not 
unexpected. If one refers to Appendix B, the reason is quite clear. 
For the period 1966-1969 the index is virtually constant thereby 
contributing nothing to the regression. It is only in the subsequent 
three years (1970-1972) that this index does affect the regression 
and for this reason it is included. 
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TABLE 11 
SWAMY AND ZELLNER POOLED REGRESSION RESULTS—FOR 
PERIOD 1966-1972 WITH GAS FUEL INDEX OMITTED 
Swamy Results-- 
Variable: Constant Ind % Resale % Staff 
Betas: .0178 -.0138 -.0113 .0072 
Asymptotic Variance: -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 .0000 
Variable: Fos Fuel Pro Ex 
Betas: .0001 -.0157 
Asymptotic Variance: 
Pooled R^: .94 
-.0000 -.0000 
Estimate of delta: 
-.0000 .0000 .0000 -.0000 .0000 .0000 
.0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 .0000 -.0000 
.0000 -.0000 -.0000 .0000 .0000 -.0000 
-.0000 -.0000 .0000 . 0000 .0000 -.0000 
.0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 .0000 .0000 
.0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 .0000 -.0000 
Zellner Results-- 
Variable: Constant Ind % Resale % Staff 
Beta: .0176 -.0139 -.0098 .0083 
Asymptotic Variance: .000000 .000003 .000000 .000000 
t Value: 25.14 -7.72 -16.23 27.67 
Variable: Fos Fuel Pro Ex 
Beta: .0010 -.0245 
Asymptotic Variance: .000000 .000035 
t Value: 1.43 -4.15 
F StatiStic: 1.5252 
Pooled R^: .96 
due to hard times besetting the utility industry. 
For ease in interpreting the results, the outputs using the 
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TABLE 12 
SWAMY AND ZELLNER POOLED REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE 
TIME PERIOD 1974-1978 WITH THE GAS FUEL INDEX 
OMITTED 
Swamy Results-- 
Variable: Constant Ind % Resale % Staff 
Beta: .0486 -.0406 -.0289 .0003 
Asymptotic Variance: .0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 
Variable: Fos Fuel Pro Ex 
Beta: .0018 -.0532 
Asymptotic Variance: .0000 -.0000 
Pooled R^: .85 
Estimate of delta: 
.0000 -.0000 .0000 . 0000 0000 -.0000 
-.0000 -.0001 -.0000 -.0000 0000 .0002 
.0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 0000 .0001 
.0000 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000 0000 .0000 
.0000 -.0000 .0000 -.0000 0000 -.0000 
-.0000 .0002 .0001 .0000 0000 -.0009 
Zellner Results-- 
Variable: Constant Ind % Resale % Staff 
Beta: .0470 -.0388 -.0291 .0008 
Asymptotic Variance: .000004 .000035 .000004 .000001 
t Value: 24.74 -6.58 -14.55 . 73 
Variable: Fos Fuel Pro Ex 
Beta: .0027 -.0402 
Asymptotic Variance: .000000 .000207 
t Value: 4.50 2.79 
F Statistics: 1.64 
Pooled R^: .86 
Zellner methodology are synopsized together with the standardized 
betas in Table 13. The t values and the standardized betas seems to 
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reflect much the same picture for each time period. For 1966-1972, 
the most important variable was the constant probably indicating the 
relative stability of the cost per kilowatt (s = .008). The next in 
terms of relative importance was the staff cost per kilowatt followed 
closely by the resale percentage. The industrial percentage was of 
limited importance while the fossil fuel index and return on sales, 
although significant, seem to contribute little to the regression. 
In summary, the results for this time period indicated that there was 
a significant relationship between the independent variables and the 
cost per kilowatt, as hypothesized, which explained 96% of the vari¬ 
ance of the cost per kilowatt. 
The results for the time period 1974-1978 clearly show the 
constant to be the most important—again probably due to the relative 
stability of the cost per kilowatt (s - .011). However, now the 
resale percentage is next in importance with the industrial percentage 
and fossil fuel index contributing somewhat to the regression. The 
return on sales, although still significant, adds little to the 
regression and the staff per kilowatt is insignificant. Thus the 
conclusions for this time period are exactly the same as the prior: 
a significant relationship was manifested which explained 86% of the 
variance of the cost per kilowatt. 
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TABLE 13 
SYNOPSIS OF THE RESULTS WITH STANDARDIZED BETAS ADDED 
1966-1972 
Constant Ind % Resale % Staff Fos Fuel Pro Ex 
Betas .0176 -.0139 -.0098 .0083 .0010 -.0245 
t Value 25.14 -7.72 16.33 27.67 1.43 4.15 
B* 2.2000 -.2120 -.5317 .6796 .0373 -.0980 
t 
• 05,82 " '• 
66 
1974-1978 = .86 
Constant Ind % Resale % Staff Fos Fuel Pro Ex 
Betas .0470 -.0388 -.0291 .0008 .0027 -.0402 
t Value 24.74 -6.58 -14.55 .73 4.50 -2.79 
B* 4.2727 -.3880 -1.1693 .0433 .2533 -.1316 
^.05,58 
Summary 
The results of this study can best be aummarized by listing 
them in order of hypotheses as stated at the end of Chapter IV. 
H-j—Supported by the correlation analysis and further suppor¬ 
ted by the results of the pooled regression analysis where 
size of staff was found to be the most important factor (aside 
from the constant) in explaining the variance of the costs per 
kilowatt in the first time period--characterized as good 
times--and insignificant in the second--characterized as bad 
times. 
H2--Although supported by the correlation analysis, little 
confidence can be expressed due to the multicol 1 inearity with 
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the staff item. 
H2--Rejected. 
H^--Although supported by the correlation analysis, this fac¬ 
tor was found to be of limited use in explaining the variance 
of the costs per kilowatt in the subsequent pooled regression 
analysis. 
H-|^--Rejected therefore adding further question to the 
correlation results with respect to H^. 
H2£--Supported by the correlation analysis and found to be of 
importance when explaining the variance of the costs per kilo¬ 
watt in the subsequent pooled regression analysis. 
H3s--Supported by the correlation analysis but little confi¬ 
dence can be expressed due to the multicol1inearity with the 
market integration factors. 
H^3--Rejected. 
H5S--SuPPorted by the correlation analysis but little confi¬ 
dence can be expressed due to the multicol1inearity with the 
market integration factors. 
Hgs—Supported by the correlation ana^^ysis but little confi¬ 
dence can be expressed due to the multicol1inearity with the 
market integration factor. 
Hy3--Rejected. 
H8s--Rejected. 
H --For nuclear fuel rejected; for gas and fossil supported 
yb 
by the correlation analysis but found to be of limited use in 
the subsequent pooled regression analysis. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Cond usions 
Due to the shortcomings with the conventional measures of 
management efficiency based upon profitability, the purpose of this 
study was to develop a prototype efficiency measurement model for the 
regulated utility sector. The Massachusetts electric utility industry 
was selected as a data base and, given the failure of past attempts 
to deal with the problem of efficiency measurement, the analysis pro¬ 
ceeded in three stages. 
First, the focus was narrowed to top management efficiency 
because this, in fact, was the crux of the problem. Studies repor¬ 
ting on all levels of management are helpful but tend to focus on 
lower levels of management where efficiency models are well defined 
(for example, simple variance analysis). Top management efficiency 
always seems to be ignored due both to its nebulous nature and to the 
methodological problems that must be surmounted. 
Secondly, the traditional economic definition of efficiency 
in the regulated sector was abandoned because of its total lack of 
concern with control. Clearly management can only be held accountable 
for that which they control; yet the economic definition focuses on 
factor inputs to the production process over which current management 
has limited control. As a result a behavioral definition of efficiency 
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espoused by Williamson (1964) was adopted which focused on expense 
preference items fully controllable by top management. It was postu¬ 
lated that management, freed from competitive pressures, would seek 
personal goals manifested by an increasing of staff, the addition of 
emoluments or a striving for professional excellence. And, using the 
traditional accounting input/output definition of efficiency, the 
first two would be indicative of inefficient management and the third 
of efficient management. 
Although theoretically preferable, physical measures of in¬ 
puts consumed to kilowatt output were not practical and, thus, dollar 
surrogates were used yielding cost per kilowatt as the operational¬ 
ized measure ofefficiency for this model. Thus it was hypothesized 
that if it could be shown that high costs per kilowatt were consistant 
with high staff costs and/or high emoluments and conversely low costs 
per kilowatt were consistant with high measures of professional ex¬ 
cellence, then it could be concluded that the Williamson model was 
supported yielding short-run measures of top management efficiency. 
However, to compare costs per kilowatt for various utilities 
necessitated a rigorous methodology and thus the third stage was 
required. Too many previous studies in the utility sector had been 
invalidated due to poor research design. Utilities differ over many 
dimensions which must be controlled in order to accomplish any compara¬ 
tive analysis. Consequently, a survey of the literature was under¬ 
taken to identify these dimensions and their relationship with cost 
per kilowatt. 
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The results of the analysis do support the above hypothesis-- 
but to varying degrees. For the period 1966-1972, a time which Cyert 
and March (1963) might describe as a "good time" or one which 
Williamson (1964) might describe as a time where "discretionary oppor¬ 
tunities are available," the staff variable (1) was positively correla¬ 
ted with cost per kilowatt and (2) when entered into the pooled regres¬ 
sion model was the most important variable, aside for the constant, 
in explaining the variance of the cost per kilowatt. In addition, 
during 1974-1978, which can be characterized as "bad times" where 
"discretionary opportunities" are not available, the staff variable 
exhibits no relationship to cost per kilowatt, further supporting the 
use of the expense preference theory in this thesis. 
One may argue that the finding only proves the obvious--that 
in bad times discretionary expenses are curtailed. Yet this is the 
very essence of the problem. Since the measures used in this thesis 
are relative measures (that is, expressed on a cost per kilowatt basis), 
if a drastic cut in their relative expenses has no effect on perfor¬ 
mance, then this would indicate that the initial level cannot be 
supported as being efficient. For the time period 1974-1978, there 
is no indication that the drop in discretionary costs caused any change 
in the effectiveness of the utilities. 
However, the results with respect to the emoluments variable, 
operationalized as management salary per kilowatt due to the lack of 
data on emoluments, are inconclusive because of the high degree of 
correlation with the staff variable. It cannot be said with any con¬ 
fidence that the observed positive correlation between this variable 
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and cost per kilowatt supports the use of the expense theory and is not 
due to the confounding effect of the staff variable. 
Likewise, the results of the professional excellence variable, 
operationalized as return on sales, is somewhat inconclusive. Even 
though the correlation analysis does yield the hypothesized direct 
relationship to cost per kilowatt, when entered into the pooled re¬ 
gression model, this factor explains little of the variance in the 
cost per kilowatt. In addition, the expected negative correlation 
between this variable and the previous two expense preference items 
was not found, further weakening the results of the correlation 
analysis with respect to this variable. 
The lack of support for the unwarranted growth factor is not 
all that damaging to the other conclusions in that it was not culled 
from the Williamson model but rather was identified from testimony be¬ 
fore the Massachusetts DPU. There was no theory base for this factor. 
Before one concludes that firm support for one item out of 
three is not particularly strong support for the hypothesis as a whole, 
it should be recognized that the high correlation between the first 
two items is not that unexplainable. If a manager feels that profes¬ 
sional excellence is not a viable means of achieving personal goals, 
there is no reason why both size of staff and emoluments cannot be 
selected as alternatives since both are thought to be indicative of 
achievement or success. Thus the high correlation between the first 
two items may be construed as a positive finding in itself. 
As a result, since the direct relationship(s) between size of 
staff and/or emoluments to cost per kilowatt cannot be explained by 
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the varying dimensions of the utilities in this study, it can be con¬ 
cluded that it (they) is (are) indicative of top management ineffi¬ 
ciency. Recognizing that the purpose of any variance analysis is 
attention directing rather than problem solving, a less forceful con¬ 
clusion might be to substitute the word "could" for "can" in the 
above sentence, arguing that it is now the task of the utilities to 
explain why this is not the case. However, since the customary re¬ 
buttal of the utilities--that they are not comparable--has been ne¬ 
gated by the methodology employed and the results of the pooled re¬ 
gression analysis indicate that essentially all of the variance in the 
cost per kilowatt has been explained by this model, any explanations 
other than this lack of efficient management should prove difficult. 
Therefore the major contributions of this thesis is to demon¬ 
strate that short-run top management efficiency measurement is possi¬ 
ble in the regulated utility sector. By controlling for the extraneous 
factors that have plagued previous works in this area, it has been 
shown that at least one expense preference item--size of staff--can be 
used to explain high costs per kilowatt and, consequently, can be used 
as a measure of efficiency for the Massachusetts electric utility 
industry. 
However, an exact methodology to be used to assess top man¬ 
agement efficiency on a firm by firm basis for any given year has not 
^^In addition, the methodology employed in this study is, in 
itself, a major contribution to research in this area. It has been 
shown that dissimilarities among utilities can be treated and that 
observations can be pooled creating a data base upon which conclusions 
can be drawn with a high degree of confidence. 
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been discussed. To simply conclude that high staff costs per kilowatt 
are indicative of inefficient management is not sufficient, again due 
to the varying dimensions of these utilities. As before, these differ¬ 
ences must be controlled before any meaningful comparisons can be made. 
In addition, it should be understood that a continuous measure 
of efficiency is not sought but, rather, categorical groupings of, 
say, "indicative of inefficient manage,ent," "questionable with re¬ 
spect to efficient management," and "indicative of efficient manage¬ 
ment" are more in order. For example, after controlling for the vary¬ 
ing characteristics, if it could be shown that high staff costs per 
kilowatt-purged of the effects of the varying characteristics--are 
consistant with high costs per kilowatt--also purged of the effects of 
the varying characteristics, then these firms could be categorized as 
"indicative of inefficient management." If continuous measures were 
to be used, this test for association would be no more than a partial 
correlation analysis which would be interpreted as the higher the par¬ 
tial correlation, the higher the confidence one could express that high 
staff costs are indicative of inefficient management and, vice versa. 
However, since categorical groupings seem more appropriate, the non- 
parametric index of predictive association. A, as developed by Goodman 
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and Kruskal will be used where A is defined as 
P(Error/A. unknown) - P(Error/A. known) 
_ J__J__ 
P(Error/A. unknown) 
J 
An excellent discussion of the Goodman and Kruskal Index 
is contained in Statistics: Probability, Inference, and Decision by 
Hays and Winkler (1971), pp. 805-810. 
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Essentially, if one were to guess whether a utility would exhibit a 
high, medium or low cost per kilowatt given no information, out of the 
twelve utilities in any given year one would, on average, guess four 
correctly and eight incorrectly; that is, P (error/A. unknown) = 8/12. 
However, if one were given some information, A. defined as the category 
the utility exhibits with respect to staff costs, the index X will ex¬ 
press how many of the eight errors would now be categorized correctly. 
Thus, a X of 8/8 or 1 would indicate a perfect correspondence between 
the staff category and the cost per kilowatt category. Conversely, a 
X of 0/8 or 0 would indicate that the staff cost category has no 
association with the cost per kilowatt category, and a negative X would 
indicate that there exists a negative relationship or that one would 
be better off guessing blindly than categorizing the cost per kilowatt 
based upon the staff cost category. 
To apply this methodology requires three steps. First, since 
it was found that the dominant factor which captured the effects of the 
varying dimensions was the market mix, two ordinary least squares 
analyses will be performed for each year with the market variables-- 
industrial percentage and resale percentage--as independent variables 
and staff cost and operating cost^^ per kilowatt, respectively, as the 
dependent variable. Secondly, using the results of these regressions, 
both the staff costs and operating costs per kilowatt will be standard- 
^^Operating cost per kilowatt is used here rather than the 
previous cost per kilowatt to focus on those items most likely to be 
controllable by top management. 
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ized by purging them of the effects of the varying market percentages. 
That is, the betas can be interpreted as the advantage a particular 
utility would enjoy with respect to either its operating costs or its 
staff costs by not being solely a residential supplier, but rather by 
being involved to some degree in either the industrial or resale mar¬ 
kets. To standardize the utilities, or to make them comparable, 
these advantages will be added back to both the staff cost and opera¬ 
ting cost per kilowatt. Finally, a three-by-three contingency table 
will be employed to test the degree of association between the high, 
medium, and low staff costs and the high, medium and low operating 
costs per kilowatt using the index of predictive association. 
Since these steps are complicated, they will be illustrated 
using the 1966 data. First, the ordinary least squares analyses are 
performed on the twelve firms with the staff costs and operating costs 
per kilowatt as dependent variables. The data as well as the compu¬ 
tations for all the time periods are presented in Appendix G. Table 14 
contains the results which can be interpreted in the following manner: 
staff cost per kilowatt is expected to be 1.3399 but will decrease 
2.4492 per unit of industrial percentage and 1.3024 per unit of resale 
percentage. Since both the industrial and resale variables are ex¬ 
pressed as decimals between 0 and 1.00, the absolute maximum decrease 
is 2.4492 and 1.3024, respectively with the industrial being substan¬ 
tially less since the maximum industrial market share is 38% or .38. 
Next, both the staff cost and operating cost per kilowatt for 
each utility are standardized using the results from Table 14. For 
example, since Firm 1 sells fourteen percent of its output to industrial 
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TABLE 14 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARE RESULTS: STAFF COST AND OPERATING 
COST PER KILOWATT AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES--!966 
Dependent variable Staff/kw Operating cost/kw 
Betas: 
Constant 1.3399 .0206 
Industrial percentage -2.4492 -.0250 
Resale percentage -1.3024 -.0160 
R^ .43 .64 
customers and thirteen percent in the wholesale market it should ex¬ 
hibit both a lower staff cost and a lower operating cost per kilowatt 
than a firm distributing one hundred percent of its output to residen¬ 
tial customers (that is, industrial = resale percentage = 0). Thus to 
make Firm 1 comparable, this advantage is added back to its observed 
staff cost and operating cost per kilowatt: 
.4642 + (.14)(2.4492) + (.13)(1.3024) = .9764 
and .0101 + (.14)( .0250) + (.13)( .0161) = .0157. 
It is assumed that these numbers are now purged of any effects with 
respect to market mix and are comparable to other firms in this time 
period. 
Lastly, these standardized costs are ranked and the contingen¬ 
cy table constructed. See Table 15. 
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TABLE 15 
STANDARDIZED COSTS AND THE RESULTING CONTINGENCY TABLE 
FOR 1966 
Firm Standardized 
Operating Cost 
Rank Standardized 
Staff Cost 
Rank 
1 .0157 11 .9764 10 
2 .0144 12 .4348 12 
3 .0208 5 1.5446 2 
4 .0175 9 .8019 11 
5 .0186 8 1.2396 8 
6 .0204 6/7 1.1618 9 
7 .0259 2 1.4180 4 
8 .0217 4 1.3486 6 
9 .0224 3 1.5075 3 
10 .0204 6/7 1.4042 5 
11 .0171 10 1.3071 7 
12 .0317 1 2.9341 1 
Staff cost 
Operating H 
H M L 
3 1 A - " -50 
cost M 1 2 1 A 12-4 
L 1 3 
Table 16 summarizes the results for all years (see Appendix G for the 
intermediate computations). 
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TABLE 16 
GOODMAN AND KRUSKAL INDEX OF PREDICTIVE ASSOCIATION— 
1966-1978 OPERATING COST/KW TO STAFF COST/KW 
Year A Year A 
1966 .50 1972 .25 
1967 .50 1974 .00 
1968 .50 1975 -.38 
1969 .63 1976 -.13 
1970 .25 1977 -.13 
1971 -.13 1978 .00 
As can readily be seen, this methodology does not generate 
perfect results; at best this method will classify nine of twelve 
utilities correctly yielding a A of 5/8 or .63. However these results 
are not unexpected. For the time period 1966-1972, this categorical 
procedure does reveal useful information—excepting 1971—which is 
consistant with the previous findings that the staff/kw variable was 
the most important variable when attempting to explain the variance of 
the cost per kilowatt. Likewise, for the time period 1974-1978, this 
procedure was found to be totally worthless. This, too, is consistant 
with the previous finding that the staff/kw contributed nothing when 
attempting to explain the variance of the cost per kilowatt for this 
period. 
Before one draws any conclusions from these results, it should 
be noted that this test of association is tentative at best. A close 
reading of Appendix G reveals that the simple ranking where the top 
four are designated "high" cost and the next four "medium is ques- 
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tionable. There are many occurances where it would be hard to justi¬ 
fy the rankings. For instance, in 1966 the fourth highest staff cost 
was 1.4180 and the fifth, 1.4042. Is this difference large enough to 
justify one being called "high" and the other "medium"? However, the 
problems were even more numerous when quartile rankings were attempted 
and subjective rankings by "apparent" clusters were subject to ex¬ 
treme bias. Thus the three group ranking was adopted. 
Yet, if the tentativeness of the ranking procedure was the 
only problem, this would not be too unsettling. Additional research 
with respect to alternative ranking procedures would probably yield a 
solution that would be acceptable. The unsettling feature that is 
highlighted by Table 16 is the complete failure for the 1974-1978 time 
period. The ramifications with respect to designing a control system 
to monitor top management efficiency in this area are immense. It 
would seem that for the system to be operative one must first ascer¬ 
tain whether the time period in question can be described as a "good" 
time where expense preference items can be expected or as a "bad" 
time where these items are now minimal and immaterial. Although this 
problem is discussed here in the "Conclusions" section, it may be that 
it could equally as well be included in the "Limitations" and/or the 
"Implications for Further Research" sections which follow. 
Limitations 
First and foremost, the above conclusions are sample speci¬ 
fic and, as stated, pertain solely to the Massachusetts electric util¬ 
ity industry. Generalizing these conclusions would require a much 
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larger sample over many jurisdictions. However one general conclusion 
that can be drawn from this project is that the results justify a more 
comprehensive study. But, due to the immense problems concerning data 
compilation, any further research is almost necessarily predicated 
upon access to a centralized data bank. 
Secondly, this study is probably one of the first to specifi¬ 
cally treat the many extraneous factors that affect research in this 
area. The results of any analysis are only as good as the assumptions 
upon which the analysis is based. Consequently great care was taken 
to describe the processes used to define and measure these extraneous 
variables. Many may disagree with the methods employed and espouse 
alternative procedures. This, in itself, should be considered a con¬ 
tribution to this research area for it will only be through such con¬ 
structive communication that proper definitions and measurement de¬ 
vices for these differing dimensions will be attained. 
Likewise regarding the endogenous variables, Williamson 
attached construct definitions to his expense preference items. Size 
of staff, emoluments and discretionary profits are not easily opera¬ 
tionalized given the information that is available to the public for 
the regulated utilities. As above, attempts have been made to measure 
these variables with which many may not agree. For example, since 
discretionary profits probably does not apply to a regulated sector, 
the factor was expanded to capture what Williamson seemingly was 
attempting to identify--management motivated by achievement or "pro¬ 
fessional excellence." Using return on sales as a surrogate may not 
be correct as indicated by the lack of an inverse relationship between 
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it and the first two preference items. However, the attitudinal 
approach used by Onsi (1963) did not seem appropriate and there 
seemed no other logical alternatives. Thus it is recognized that 
further research in this area is needed and constructive criticism is 
expected and desired. 
The last limitation deals more with the methodology than with 
the problems inherent in the variable measurement area. This study 
is founded on a variance analysis based on historical data rather than 
on any type of standard. If, in fact, all utilities included in this 
data base were inefficient, this methodology would not reveal such a 
situation. It is only when the data reflect the whole spectrum of 
efficiency that the methodology will be appropriate. It would be 
theoretically more correct to use an engineering approach where stan¬ 
dards would be set for each item and variance than analyzed. This, 
however, is not realistic due to the discretionary nature of the 
costs and, therefore, the historical approach taken can be defended 
on a pragmatic basis. Nonetheless, to insure confidence in this 
approach dictates a large sample where the probability is greater 
than the entire spectrum of efficiency is captured. 
Implications for Further Research 
Aside from the implications referred to in the prior section, 
additional avenues for further research do suggest themselves. As 
discussed in Chapter IV, the availability of additional, more refined 
data now required by the SEC in Releases 33-6003 and 33-5949 (issued 
in 1978) will permit (1) more accurate measurement of one variable-- 
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emoluments--and (2) the inclusion of one additional variable that was 
captured only in an oblique fashion in this study--the opportunity for 
discretion. It is now necessary to report emoluments distinct from 
management salary, thus making the measurement of this variable much 
less troublesome. It would be interesting to discover whether emolu¬ 
ments is a separate item that does capture a different dimension than 
size of staff or, as hypothesized in the prior section, that either 
can be used to identify a management that does not perceive profession¬ 
al excellence as its only means of achievement. 
In addition, the opportunity for discretion may now be treated 
in a more direct fashion. Berle and Means (1932) suggested that data 
on management security holdings may be helpful, postulating that having 
a significant interest in a company might motivate management to be 
more efficient. Since this data is now required by the SEC, inclusion 
of this variable is possible in future studies using utilities regis¬ 
tered with the SEC. 
Another approach to this problem that might circumvent the 
extraneous factors problem is to treat the holding companies as one 
large utility rather than as was done in the study, to ignore them and 
simply treat the individual subsidiaries--each of which is usually in¬ 
volved in only one activity--as separate utilities. For example, 
Holyoke Water Power generates power for Northeast Utilities which in 
turn distributes through Western Massachusetts Electric. Whatever 
regulating and/or tax advantage that is accrued from this corporate 
structure is not the issue; although legally distinct entities they, 
in essence, are divisions of one uti1ity--Northeast Utilities. In 
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Massachusetts there are five such holding companies which, on a con¬ 
solidated basis, are probably quite similar over all dimensions and 
therefore readily comparable. However, many problems with this 
approach are immediately apparent. First, to produce consolidated 
information would not be easy unless full information with respect to 
intercompany transactions is available and, since this corporate 
structure affords these holding companies some economic advantage, it 
is unlikely that this information would be made available. Secondly, 
these holding companies encompass more than one jurisdiction, thus 
raising the problem of non uniformity of data. Northeast Utilities 
has holdings in three New England states, all with different reporting 
requirements. And lastly, all utilities are not wholly owned by the 
holding companies. It is common practice to buy percentage interests 
in generating plants, based upon projected demands and this further 
complicates the consolidated approach. Yet, since these utilities do 
share a common management, this consolidated approach may be another 
way to test the feasibility of using the expense preference model to 
measure top management efficiency. 
To End 
The introductory chapter of this thesis described the problem 
of efficiency measurement in the regulated sector and enumerated three 
major issues: (1) the lack of operational definitions, (2) the varying 
characteristics which do not facilitate interutility comparisons, and 
(3) the small number of firms resulting in questionable validity of 
common statistical methodologies. Each has been treated in detail with 
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the end result being a short-run efficiency management model which, 
although subject to a number of limitations, successfully dealt with 
the above problems and performed well, producing significant results. 
Moreover, due to the availability of desirable, more refined data in 
the very near future, further research using this methodology appears 
promising. 
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APPENDIX A 
MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC UTILITIES USED IN THE STUDY 
Boston Edison Company 
Boston, Massachusetts 
Brockton Edison Company 
Brockton, Massachusetts 
Cambridge Electric Light Company 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 
Fall River Electric Light Company 
Fall River, Massachusetts 
Holyoke Water Power Company 
Holyoke, Massachusetts 
Manchester Electric Company 
Manchester, Massachusetts 
Massachusetts Electric Company 
Westborough, Massachusetts 
Montaup Electric Company 
Fall River, Massachusetts 
New England Power Company 
Westborough, Massachusetts 
Nantucket Electric Company 
Nantucket, Massachusetts 
Western Massachusetts Electric Company 
West Springfield, Massachusetts 
Yankee Atomic Electric Company 
Westborough, Massachusetts 
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APPENDIX B 
FUEL INDICES--1966 = BASE YEAR 
Year Oil Coal Nuclear Gas 
1966 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1967 .95 1.05 .86 1.05 
1968 .91 1.09 .96 1.06 
1969 .89 1.18 .96 1.11 
1970 1.19 1.60 .86 1.14 
1971 1.58 1.94 .77 1.17 
1972 1.51 2.08 .83 1.13 
1973 1.81 2.34 .92 1.24 
1974 4.62 3.57 1.11 1.87 
1975 4.72 4.07 .94 2.11 
1976 4.31 3.86 1.32 2.19 
1977 4.98 4.09 1.47 2.35 
1978 4.74 4.52 1.79 2.46 
Source: Survey of Current Business--National Income Issue, United 
States Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics. 
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appendix c 
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TABLES AND APPENDICES 
Costkwl--cost per kilowatt which includes a charge for depreciation. 
Costkw2*--cost per kilowatt which omits depreciation. 
Res ^--percentage of total output used by residential consumers. 
Comm %--percentage of total output used by commercial consumers. 
Ind %--percentage of total output used by industrial consumers. 
Resale %—percentage of total output sold wholesale. 
Pool--total kilowatts either sold to or bought from the energy pool. 
Gen %--percentage of total dollars invested in generation plant after 
adjustment for specific price level factors. 
Dist %--percentage of total dollars invested in distribution plant 
after adjustment for specific price level factors. 
SGen %--percentage of total assets invested in steam generation. 
HGen %--percentage of total assets invested in hydro generation. 
NGen %--percentage of total assets invested in nuclear generation. 
GGen %--percentage of total assets invested in gas generation. 
Staffl--staff expense expressed as a percentage of sales. 
Staff2--staff expense per kilowatt output. 
Sal aryl--management salary expense expressed as a percentage of sales. 
Salary2--management salary per kilowatt output. 
VarMkt--the ratio of (Res % + Comm %) to (Res % + Comm % + Ind %) 
multiplied by the Dist %; postulated to be a measure of 
stability for the distribution activity. 
VarLoad--the ratio to peak demand to average demand multiplied by the 
Gen %; postulated to be a measure of stability for the gener¬ 
ation activity. 
U--unwarranted growth factor derived from multiplying the growth rate 
by the excess capacity ratio. 
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EofSl--economy of scale factor derived by taking the logarithm of capa¬ 
city and then multiplying it by the Gen %. 
EofS2--economy of scale factor derived by taking the logarithm of the 
output. 
FosFuel--the fossil fuel index derived from averaging the coal and oil 
fuel indices and then multiplying by the Gen %. 
NucFuel--the nuclear fuel index derived by multiplying the nuclear fuel 
index by the Gen %. 
GasFuel--the gas fuel index derived by multiplying the gas fuel index 
by the Gen %. 
AgeS--the weighted average age of the steam generation facilities. 
AgeH--the weighted average age of the hydro generation facilities. 
AgeN--the weighted average age of the nuclear generation facilities. 
AgeG--the weighted average age of the gas generation facilities. 
ProExl--the variance of the return on equity from the allowed 13%. 
ProEx2—the return on sales. 
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APPENDIX E 
DATA POOLED BY UTILITY 
Utility 1 
Year Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1966 .0139 14.00 13.00 .4642 27.66 12.69 
1967 .0134 14.00 15.00 .4240 24.68 12.89 
1968 .0131 14.00 14.00 .4159 23.96 12.48 
1969 .0139 14.00 13.00 .4520 22.75 12.54 
1970 .0155 14.00 15.00 .4847 29.11 12.26 
1971 .0201 14.00 15.00 .5640 28.70 12.25 
1972 .0211 14.00 13.00 .5558 18.45 12.44 
1973 .0210 14.00 17.00 .5040 19.48 9.58 
1974 .0355 15.00 16.00 .5676 44.20 6.59 
1975 .0372 14.00 13.00 .6224 74.84 6.73 
1976 .0389 15.00 14.00 .6661 62.24 7.19 
1977 .0403 15.00 13.00 .7351 76.85 6.28 
1978 .0385 14.00 13.00 .7639 77.47 8.55 
Utility 2 
Year Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1966 .0170 1.00 1.00 .3973 4.20 15.19 
1967 .0166 2.00 1.00 .3604 3.80 14.25 
1968 .0164 2.00 1.00 .3546 3.61 11.55 
1969 .0168 1.00 1.00 .3246 3.70 9.67 
1970 .0176 1.00 1.00 .3135 4.97 2.70 
1971 .0200 3.00 1.00 .3367 6.47 8.86 
1972 .0198 3.00 1.00 .3256 6.26 7.42 
1973 .0237 4.00 5.00 .3177 0.00 4.58 
1974 .0350 5.00 14.00 .3053 0.00 6.09 
1975 .0372 6.00 6.00 .3840 0.00 9.82 
1976 .0406 6.00 0.00 .4211 0.00 
13.29 
1977 .0461 6.00 0.00 .4952 0.00 
11.17 
1978 .0437 7.00 0.00 .5249 0.00 
15.50 
144 
145 
Year Costkw Ind % 
Utility 3 
Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1966 .0136 38.00 7.00 .5227 51.84 9.06 
1967 .0134 38.00 7.00 .5440 51.55 10.20 
1968 .0137 38.00 6.00 .5903 50.55 8.06 
1969 .0140 38.00 6.00 .6129 52.62 6.86 
1970 .0153 34.00 6.00 .6299 68.85 7.07 
1971 .0183 34.00 6.00 .6450 86.28 6.76 
1972 .0202 33.00 7.00 .6619 81.28 4.42 
1973 .0240 31.00 6.00 .4980 85.75 1.57 
1974 .0333 31.00 8.00 .7524 182.84 3.51 
1975 .0365 32.00 7.00 .5239 211.22 4.72 
1976 .0350 33.00 7.00 .5027 198.84 5.59 
1977 .0382 34.00 7.00 .5385 225.77 4.93 
1978 .0378 33.00 7.00 .6413 233.07 4.45 
Utility 4 
Year Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1966 .0147 7.00 21.00 .3570 13.76 11.17 
1967 .0140 6.00 22.00 .3384 13.84 11.63 
1968 .0132 6.00 24.00 .3110 13.47 10.56 
1969 .0134 7.00 25.00 .2840 13.25 7.79 
1970 .0143 7.00 26.00 .2888 18.40 7.43 
1971 .0169 6.00 29.00 .3209 23.33 7.46 
1972 .0170 5.00 29.00 .3276 23.94 5.74 
1973 .0209 6.00 23.00 .3559 0.00 4.32 
1974 .0381 11.00 6.00 .6203 0.00 6.01 
1975 .0401 10.00 3.00 .6947 0.00 6.80 
1976 .0402 10.00 0.00 .6595 0.00 7.03 
1977 .0435 11.00 0.00 .7562 0.00 3.52 
1978 .0416 14.00 0.00 .7900 0.00 6.32 
Utility 5 
Year Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1966 .0063 0.00 85.00 .1326 25.39 9.07 
1967 .0064 0.00 88.00 .1333 25.22 11.82 
1968 .0064 0.00 87.00 .1441 25.40 6.50 
1969 .0073 0.00 86.00 .1565 26.42 8.25 
1970 .0088 0.00 89.00 .1782 36.48 8.67 
1971 .0103 0.00 90.00 .1740 46.02 5.06 
1972 .0107 0.00 89.00 .1633 47.11 2.92 
1973 .0128 0.00 90.00 .1760 53.44 1.07 
1974 .0211 0.00 90.00 .1425 122.24 -7.30 
1975 .0242 0.00 91.00 .1798 133.46 -.43 
1976 .0232 10.00 89.00 .2679 113.18 
2.25 
1977 .0254 9.00 90.00 .2008 91.08 
1.61 
1978 .0206 24.00 74.00 .8417 91.07 
9.63 
146 
Year Costkw Ind % 
Uti1ity 
Resale % 
6 
Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1966 .0242 0.00 0.00 1.1618 0.00 13.17 
1967 .0229 0.00 0.00 1.0983 0.00 13.20 
1968 .0237 0.00 0.00 1.0015 0.00 9.66 
1969 .0235 0.00 0.00 .9382 0.00 9.50 
1970 .0231 0.00 0.00 .8885 0.00 9.61 
1971 .0235 0.00 0.00 1.0001 0.00 9.15 
1972 .0257 0.00 0.00 .9302 0.00 8.37 
1973 .0290 0.00 0.00 1.0683 0.00 5.75 
1974 .0413 0.00 0.00 1.3397 0.00 5.72 
1975 .0453 0.00 0.00 1.0996 0.00 5.41 
1976 .0467 0.00 0.00 .9726 0.00 7.03 
1977 .0501 0.00 0.00 .9052 0.00 5.68 
1978 .0514 0.00 0.00 .9590 0.00 4.07 
utility 7 
Year Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1966 .0198 32.00 5.00 .5691 2.62 5.14 
1967 .0193 23.00 3.00 .5395 2.59 5.49 
1968 .0186 23.00 0.00 .5607 2.53 6.16 
1969 .0185 22.00 0.00 .5430 2.33 5.85 
1970 .0185 21.00 0.00 .5521 .39 6.69 
1971 .0187 20.00 0.00 .5375 4.07 7.50 
1972 .0211 20.00 0.00 .5618 0.00 5.83 
1973 .0226 21.00 0.00 .5270 0.00 b. /U 
1974 .0334 23.00 0.00 .3865 0.00 4.33 
1975 .0364 22.00 0.00 .3684 0.00 4.50 
1976 .0386 22.00 0.00 .3870 0.00 2.60 
1977 .0426 22.00 0.00 .3881 0.00 3.36 
1978 .0411 23.00 0.00 .3759 0.00 4.34 
utility 8 
Year Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1966 .0065 0.00 100.00 .0462 81.54 
7.79 
1967 .0062 0.00 100.00 .0469 83.36 
8.07 
1968 .0062 0.00 100.00 .0448 77.97 
7.40 
1969 .0062 0.00 100.00 .0538 81.43 
7.75 
1970 .0073 0.00 100.00 .0557 108.83 
6.27 
1971 .0097 0.00 100.00 .0539 119.79 
5.49 
1972 .0102 0.00 100.00 .0590 124.40 
4.04 
1973 .0132 0.00 100.00 .0584 
144.66 6.52 
r 1 r 
1974 .0087 0.00 100.00 .0762 
300.64 5.15 
1975 .0243 0.00 100.00 .0971 
332.49 4.34 
1976 .0239 0.00 98.00 .1096 
314.53 4. yb 
/I >1 n 
1977 .0275 0.00 98.00 .1046 
3b1.97 4.48 
1978 .0241 0.00 98.00 .0944 
352.49 5.69 
147 
Year Costkw Ind % 
Utility 
Resale % 
9 
Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1966 .0077 2.00 98.00 .1822 8.06 14.41 
1967 .0075 2.00 98.00 .1772 7.83 15.58 
1968 .0076 2.00 98.00 .1915 7.66 14.64 
1969 .0075 2.00 98.00 .1816 13.87 14.69 
1970 .0076 1.00 99.00 .1846 19.22 11.79 
1971 .0081 1.00 99.00 .1990 24.39 12.38 
1972 .0090 0.00 99.00 .2148 32.62 14.44 
1973 .0113 1.00 99.00 .2336 38.18 11.07 
1974 .0207 1.00 99.00 .1319 109.48 7.66 
1975 .0223 0.00 98.00 .1430 125.68 7.63 
1976 .0216 1.00 98.00 .1504 119.89 10.49 
1977 .0250 0.00 98.00 .1709 135.62 9.35 
1978 .0230 0.00 98.00 .1623 127.02 9.43 
Utility 10 
Year Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1966 .0050 0.00 100.00 .1018 0.00 10.78 
1967 .0044 0.00 100.00 .1119 0.00 11.05 
1968 .0041 0.00 100.00 .1161 0.00 11.16 
1969 .0052 0.00 100.00 .1129 0.00 11.04 
1970 .0048 0.00 100.00 .0999 0.00 11.20 
1971 .0044 0.00 100.00 .0757 0.00 9.03 
1972 .0108 0.00 100.00 .1822 0.00 11.57 
1973 .0088 0.00 100.00 .1529 0.00 8.24 
1974 .0109 0.00 100.00 .0879 0.00 4.78 
1975 .0084 0.00 100.00 .0578 0.00 9.90 
1976 .0094 0.00 100.00 .0622 0.00 11.65 
1977 .0133 0.00 100.00 .0995 0.00 11.23 
1978 .0140 0.00 100.00 .1346 0.00 12.32 
utility 11 
Year Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1966 .0133 26.00 3.00 .6312 12.69 12.92 
1967 .0133 26.00 4.00 .4598 12.63 12.32 
1968 .0127 26.00 3.00 .5303 12.26 12.31 
1969 .0131 25.00 3.00 .5061 11.55 12.66 
1970 .0145 24.00 4.00 .5353 11.06 13.06 
1971 .0154 24.00 4.00 .5369 5.81 14.35 
1972 .0160 23.00 4.00 .5335 6.70 15.22 
1973 .0200 23.00 4.00 .6037 8.07 13.31 
1974 .0286 25.00 4.00 .6771 17.92 9.81 
1975 .0322 21.00 4.00 .7056 14.42 10.14 
1976 .0289 21.00 3.00 .7230 13.25 8. 76 
1977 .0289 21.00 3.00 .7664 14.77 
9.86 
1978 .0309 22.00 3.00 .7798 15.10 
9.94 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
148 
Utility 12 
Costkw Ind % Resale % staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
.0399 0.00 0.00 2.9341 .11 13.60 
.0394 0.00 0.00 2.9263 .10 13.61 
.0372 0.00 0.00 2.8419 .08 11.80 
.0334 0.00 0.00 2.2841 .06 12.86 
.0351 0.00 0.00 2.4242 .07 10.23 
.0323 0.00 0.00 2.2106 .08 10.99 
.0288 0.00 0.00 2.1209 .05 10.81 
.0305 0.00 0.00 2.0484 .02 10.10 
.0385 0.00 0.00 2.0739 .03 8.81 
.0408 0.00 0.00 2.2170 .02 9.32 
.0437 0.00 0.00 2.2247 .02 7.79 
.0471 1.00 0.00 2.4703 .01 7.21 
.0534 1.00 0.00 2.5928 .01 8.80 
appendix f 
DATA POOLED BY YEAR 
Utility Costkw Ind % 
1966 
Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 .0139 14.00 13.00 .4642 27.66 12.69 
2 .0170 1.00 1.00 .3973 4.20 15.19 
3 .0136 38.00 7.00 .5227 51.84 9.06 
4 .0147 7.00 21.00 .3570 13.76 11.17 
5 .0063 0.00 85.00 .1326 25.39 9.07 
6 .0242 0.00 0.00 1.1618 0.00 13.17 
7 .0198 32.00 5.00 .5691 2.62 5.14 
8 .0065 0.00 100.00 .0462 81.54 7.79 
9 .0077 2.00 98.00 .1822 8.06 14.41 
10 .0050 0.00 100.00 .1018 0.00 10.78 
11 0.133 26.00 3.00 .6312 12.69 12.92 
12 .0399 0.00 0.00 2.9341 .11 13.60 
1967 
Utility Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 .0134 14.00 15.00 .4240 24.68 12.89 
2 .0166 2.00 1.00 .3604 3.80 14.25 
3 .0134 38.00 7.00 .5440 51.55 10.20 
4 .0140 6.00 22.00 .3384 13.84 11.63 
5 .0064 0.00 88.00 .1333 25.22 11.82 
6 .0229 0.00 0.00 1.0983 0.00 13.20 
7 .0193 23.00 3.00 .5395 2.59 5.49 
8 .0062 0.00 100.00 .0469 83.36 8.07 
9 .0075 2.00 98.00 .1772 7.83 15.58 
10 .0044 0.00 100.00 .1119 0.00 11.05 
11 .0133 26.00 4.00 .4598 12.63 12.32 
12 .0394 0.00 0.00 2.9263 .10 13.61 
1968 
Uti1ity Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 .0131 14.00 14.00 .4159 23.96 12.48 
2 .0164 2.00 1.00 .3546 3.61 11.55 
3 .0137 38.00 6.00 .5903 50.55 8.06 
4 .0132 6.00 24.00 .3110 13.47 10.56 
5 .0064 0.00 87.00 .1441 25.40 6.50 
6 .0237 0.00 0.00 1.0015 0.00 9.66 
7 .0186 23.00 0.00 .5607 2.53 6.16 
8 .0062 0.00 100.00 .0448 77.97 7.40 
9 .0076 2.00 98.00 .1915 7.66 14.64 
10 .0041 0.00 100.00 .1161 0.00 11.16 
11 .0127 26.00 3.00 .5303 12.26 12.31 
12 .0372 0.00 0.00 2.8419 .08 11.80 
150 
1969 
Utility Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 .0139 14.00 13.00 .4520 22.75 12.54 
2 .0168 1.00 1.00 .3246 3.70 9.67 
3 .0140 38.00 6.00 .6129 52.62 6.86 
4 .0134 7.00 25.00 .2840 13.25 7.79 
5 .0073 0.00 86.00 .1565 26.42 8.25 
6 .0235 0.00 0.00 .9382 0.00 9.50 
7 .0185 22.00 0.00 .5430 2.33 5.85 
8 .0062 0.00 100.00 .0538 81.43 7.75 
9 .0075 2.00 98.00 .1816 13.87 14.69 
10 .0052 0.00 100.00 .1129 0.00 11.04 
11 .0131 25.00 3.00 .5061 11.55 12.66 
12 .0034 0.00 0.00 2.2841 .06 12.86 
1970 
Utility Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 .0155 14.00 15.00 .4847 29.11 12.26 
2 .0176 1.00 1.00 .3135 4.97 2.70 
3 .0153 34.00 6.00 .7299 68.85 7.07 
4 .0143 7.00 26.00 .2888 18.40 7.43 
5 .0088 0.00 89.00 .1782 36.48 8.67 
6 .0231 0.00 0.00 .8885 0.00 9.61 
7 .0185 21.00 0.00 .5521 .39 6.69 
8 .0073 0.00 100.00 .0557 108.83 6.27 
9 .0076 1.00 99.00 .1846 19.22 11.79 
10 .0048 0.00 100.00 .0999 0.00 11.20 
11 .0145 24.00 4.00 .5353 11.06 13.06 
12 .0351 0.00 0.00 2.4242 .07 10.23 
1971 
Utility Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 .0201 14.00 15.00 .5640 28.70 12.25 
2 .0200 3.00 1.00 .3367 6.47 8.86 
3 .0183 34.00 6.00 .6450 86.28 6.76 
4 .0169 6.00 29.00 .3209 23.33 7.46 
5 .0103 0.00 90.00 .1740 46.02 5.06 
6 .0235 0.00 0.00 1.0001 0.00 9.15 
7 .0187 20.00 0.00 .5375 4.07 7.50 
8 .0097 0.00 100.00 .0539 119.79 5.49 
9 .0081 1.00 99.00 .1990 24.39 12.38 
10 .0044 0.00 100.00 .0757 0.00 9.03 
11 .0154 24.00 4.00 .5369 5.81 14.35 
12 .0323 0.00 0.00 2.2106 .08 10.99 
151 
Utility Costkw Ind % 
1972 
Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 .0211 14.00 13.00 .5558 18.45 12.44 
2 .0198 3.00 1.00 .3256 6.26 7.42 
3 .0202 33.00 7.00 .6619 81.28 4.42 
4 .0170 5.00 29.00 .3276 23.94 5.74 
5 .0107 0.00 89.00 .1633 47.11 2.92 
6 .0257 0.00 0.00 .9302 0.00 8.37 
7 .0211 20.00 0.00 .5618 0.00 5.83 
8 .0102 0.00 100.00 .0590 124.40 4.04 
9 .0090 0.00 99.00 .2148 32.62 14.44 
10 .0108 0.00 100.00 .1822 0.00 11.57 
11 .0160 23.00 4.00 .5335 6.70 15.22 
12 .0288 0.00 0.00 2.1209 .05 10.81 
1973 
Utility Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 .0210 14.00 17.00 .5040 19.48 9.58 
2 .0237 4.00 5.00 .3177 0.00 4.58 
3 .0240 31.00 6.00 .4980 85.75 1.57 
4 .0209 6.00 23.00 .3559 0.00 4.32 
5 .0128 0.00 90.00 .1760 53.44 1.07 
6 .0290 0.00 0.00 1.0683 0.00 5.75 
7 .0226 21.00 0.00 .5270 0.00 5.70 
8 .0132 0.00 100.00 .0584 144.66 6.52 
9 .0113 1.00 99.00 .2336 38.18 11.07 
10 .0088 0.00 100.00 .1529 0.00 8.24 
11 .0200 23.00 4.00 .6037 8.07 13.31 
12 .0305 0.00 0.00 2.0484 .02 10.10 
1974 
Uti1ity Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
.0355 15.00 16.00 
.0350 5.00 14.00 
.0333 31.00 8.00 
.0381 11.00 6.00 
.0211 0.00 90.00 
.0413 0.00 0.00 
.0334 23.00 0.00 
.0087 0.00 100.00 
.0207 1.00 99.00 
.0109 0.00 100.00 
.0286 25.00 4.00 
.0385 0.00 0.00 
.5676 44.20 6.59 
.3053 0.00 6.09 
.7524 182.84 3.51 
.6203 0.00 6.01 
.1425 122.24 -7.30 
1.3397 0.00 5.72 
.3865 0.00 4.33 
.0762 300.64 5.15 
.1319 109.48 7.66 
.0879 0.00 4.78 
.6771 17.92 9.81 
2.0739 .03 8.81 
152 
Utility Costkw Ind % 
1975 
Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 .0372 14.00 13.00 .6224 74.84 6.73 
2 .0372 6.00 6.00 .3840 0.00 9.82 
3 .0365 32.00 7.00 .5239 211.22 4.72 
4 .0401 10.00 3.00 .6947 0.00 6.80 
5 .0242 0.00 91.00 .1798 133.46 -.43 
6 .0453 0.00 0.00 1.0996 0.00 5.41 
7 .0364 22.00 0.00 .3684 0.00 4.50 
8 .0243 0.00 100.00 .0971 332.49 4.34 
9 .0223 0.00 98.00 .1430 125.68 7.63 
10 .0084 0.00 100.00 .0578 0.00 9.90 
11 .0322 21.00 4.00 .7056 14.42 10.14 
12 .0408 0.00 0.00 2.2170 .02 9.32 
1976 
Utility Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 .0389 15.00 14.00 .6661 62.24 7.19 
2 .0406 6.00 0.00 .4211 0.00 13.29 
3 .0350 33.00 7.00 .5027 198.84 5.59 
4 .0402 10.00 0.00 .6595 0.00 7.03 
5 .0232 10.00 89.00 .2679 113.18 2.25 
6 .0467 0.00 0.00 .9726 0.00 7.03 
7 .0386 22.00 0.00 .3870 0.00 2.60 
8 .0239 0.00 98.00 .1096 314.53 4.95 
9 .0216 1.00 98.00 .1504 119.89 10.49 
10 .0094 0.00 100.00 .0622 0.00 11.65 
11 .0289 21.00 3.00 .7230 13.25 8.76 
12 .0437 0.00 0.00 2.2247 .02 7.79 
1977 
Utility Costkw Ind % Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
.0403 15.00 13.00 
.0461 6.00 0.00 
.0382 34.00 7.00 
.0435 11.00 0.00 
.0254 9.00 90.00 
.0501 0.00 0.00 
.0426 22.00 0.00 
.0275 0.00 98.00 
.0250 0.00 98.00 
.0133 0.00 100.00 
.0289 21.00 3.00 
.0471 1.00 0.00 
.7351 76.85 6.28 
.4952 0.00 11.17 
.5385 225.77 4.93 
.7562 0.00 3.52 
.2008 91.08 1.61 
.9052 0.00 5.68 
.3881 0.00 3.36 
.1046 351.97 4.48 
.1709 135.62 9.35 
.0995 0.00 11.23 
.7664 14.77 9.86 
2.4703 .01 7.21 
153 
Utility Costkw Ind % 
1978 
Resale % Staff FosFuel Pro Ex 
1 .0385 14.00 13.00 .7639 77.47 8.55 
2 .0437 7.00 0.00 .5249 0.00 15.50 
3 .0378 33.00 7.00 .6413 233.07 4.45 
4 .0416 14.00 0.00 .7900 0.00 6.32 
5 .0206 24.00 74.00 .8417 91.07 9.63 
6 .0514 0.00 0.00 .9590 0.00 4.07 
7 .0411 23.00 0.00 .3759 0.00 4.34 
8 .0241 0.00 98.00 .0944 352.49 5.69 
9 .0230 0.00 98.00 .1623 127.02 9.43 
10 .0140 0.00 100.00 .1346 0.00 12.32 
11 .0309 22.00 3.00 .7798 15.10 9.94 
12 .0534 1.00 0.00 2.5928 .01 8.80 
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